International actors

On 8 February, the Russian Foreign Minister, spoke to the new Prime Minister designate for Libya and the new President of the Presidency Council. On 15 February, an Egyptian delegation arrived in Tripoli to explore the reopening of the Egyptian embassy in the Libyan capital.

On 2 February, the UN published its Panel of Experts report on Sudan including details of the UAE’s involvement with the LNA in Libya. On 4 February, the UNSC instructed the UNSG to deploy international monitors in Libya. On 5 February, the LPDF elected Abdul Hameed Dabaiba as the new Prime Minister for Libya. On 6 February, the 5+5 JMC agreed to clear mines from Sirte ahead of the reopening of the coastal road.

On 27 January, the GNA’s Minister of Defence in the GNA, announced that 1,300 soldiers have received military training with Turkish forces in Libya. On 28 January, The Times reported that a Russian air defence missile system was secretly flown from Zuwwara to a US air base in Germany. On 28 January, the Acting Head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, called on the UNSC to pass a resolution to dissolve all parallel executive entities. On 1 February, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) opened in Geneva.

On 21 January, UNSMIL announced the start of the nomination period for the submission of candidates for the three-member Presidency Council (PC) and the post of Prime Minister. On 23 January, the 90-day deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, as agreed in the October 23 ceasefire, passed largely unheeded.

On 15 January, the UNSC approved Jan Kubis as the new SRSG and Head of UNSMIL to replace Stephanie Williams. On 19 January, UNSMIL announced that the LPDF has agreed on a mechanism for selecting the reformed PC and new executive authority in Libya.

On 6 January, UNSMIL announced that it had convened the second virtual meeting of the LPDF’s Advisory Committee. On 9 January, UNSMIL issued a statement announcing its “expectation” that international monitors will be deployed to support Libya’s 5+5 ceasefire agreement. 

On 29 December, the GNA Foreign Minister met with his Russian counterpart to discuss political and military developments in Libya. On 30 December, the UNSG wrote to the members of the UNSC requesting the creation of a security monitoring group for Libya. On 2 January, the Acting Head UNSMIL, issued a statement announcing that UNSMIL had formed an Advisory Committee for the LPDF.

On 23 December, the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of troops to Libya for a further 18 months. On 26 December, Turkish Defence Minister and a Turkish Military delegation arrived in Tripoli for meetings with the GNA. On 27 December, an Egyptian delegation arrived in Tripoli for an official visit.

On 16 December, the GNA’s Interior Minister met with the US Ambassador to Libya to discuss security cooperation between the US and the GNA. On 17 December, the Italian Prime Minister met with Haftar to review developments in the Libyan-Libyan dialogues. On 19 December, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service reportedly met with Haftar to discuss joint security issues.

On 10 December, the LNA spokesman declared that Libya was in a ‘state of war’ with Turkey. On 10 December, the GNA released two Russian citizens who had been held on charges of election meddling. On 12 December, the Turkish presidency submitted a motion to the Turkish parliament to extend troop deployment in Libya.

Over the last week, there have been signs that international actors are stepping up military engagement, potentially violating the permanent ceasefire agreement. On 4 December, the GNA signed a military cooperation agreement with Italy to strengthen capacities in training and health care activities. On 6 December, the SOHR reported that Turkey was preparing to send a new batch of Syrian fighters to Libya. On the same day, a document surfaced dating back to November revealing that 1,200 soldiers from the Sudanese paramilitary RSF were given permission to be deployed at Jufra airbase.

On 25 November, the US unilaterally blacklisted the Kaniyat militia. On 24 November, Speaker of the HoR, Saleh, arrived in Moscow to meet with Russian officials. On 23 November, the 5+5 JMC met with the Security Working Group formed through the so-called Berlin process of January 2020 to brief the international community.

On 23 November, Germany accused Turkey of preventing German forces belonging to the EU mission Operation IRINI from fully searching a Turkish cargo ship. The same day Sputnik reported that the speaker of the HoR, Saleh, would be visiting Moscow soon. On 20 November, UNSG Guterres told the UNSC that he would name Bulgarian politician, Nikolai Mladenov, as the new UN Special Envoy to Libya. On 18 November, the USs House of Representatives voted to pass the Libya Stabilization Act. On 18 November, GNA MoI, Bashaagha traveled to Paris for several days.

On the evening of 15 November, the UN-facilitated LPDF concluded its discussions in Tunis. On 17 November, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit the Libyan capital of Tripoli and the city of Misrata. On 12 November, GNA Defence Minister al-Namroush met in Doha with Qatari Foreign Minister and Deputy PM Abdurrahman al-Thanni.

On 9 November, the UN-facilitated dialogue process known as the LPDF began its first meetings in Tunis. On 3 November, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams, said that a meeting of the JMC had led to agreements for implementing the ceasefire that had been announced on 23 October. On 4 November, GNA MoI Bashaagha arrived in Cairo to discuss security cooperation with Egyptian officials. On 5 November, representatives from the HoR and the HCS met in Morocco for a third round of talks. On 6 November, the US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, spoke with GNA Foreign Minister Siyala about the US intention to secure a property in the capital Tripoli.

On 1 November, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams met with Deputy PM of the GNA, Maiteeq to discuss the LPDF. On 1 November, head of the HCS, al-Mishri and an accompanying delegation arrived in Doha to meet with the emir of Qatar, al-Thani. On 1 November, the Russian representative to the UNSC, Nebenzia, reportedly announced Russia’s full support for the exit of all foreign mercenaries from Libya. On 2 November, the US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, travelled to Moscow. On 31 October, Speaker of HoR, Saleh arrived in Cairo.

Several countries and international organizations welcomed the ceasefire announcement from 23 October. On 25 October, UNSMIL released the names of 75 delegates invited to participate in the LPDF. On 22 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov reportedly received his Turkish counterpart, Sedan Onal, in Moscow for a new round of consultations on resolving the Libyan and Syrian crises.

On 12 October, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams, met with Tunisian President Saied to begin discussing details of the LPDF scheduled to take place in Tunisia. On 14 October, Italian Foreign Minister di Maio met with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 15 October, the UN released a statement asserting that the HoR and the HCS had agreed at the end of the 11-13 October talks in Cairo. On 16 October, the GNA said that the Foreign Minister, Siyala, had met with the Turkish Ambassador to Libya, Aksen. On 17 October, it was reported that Williams had been holding a series of meetings with mayors from municipalities across Libya.

On 10 October, a group of EU ambassadors met with GNA Prime Minister al-Serraj in Tripoli. The same day, UNSMIL issued a press release stating that the LPDF would be held through a series of online sessions as well as face-to-face meetings. Also on 10 October, Acting Head of UNSMIL Williams said the UN would hold direct, face-to-face talks in Geneva beginning on 19 October between delegations of the 5+5 JMC. On 6 October, the UN adopted a proposal from the UNHRC to postpone investigations into human rights violations in Libya by the UN Fact-finding Mission in Libya.

On 5 October, the UN and Germany began co-hosting a virtual meeting of the countries and IOs that took part in the Berlin Conference on Libya of January 2020. On 2 October, a draft 10-page plan prepared by the EU’s foreign policy office was unveiled. Also on 2 October, the Turkish MoD said that the UN had ‘registered’ the deal for demarcation of maritime boundaries reached between Turkey and the GNA. On 30 September, United States Defence Secretary Mark Esper travelled to Tunis.

On 27 September, a second round of UN-mediated meetings was set to occur in Bouznika, Morocco, but was delayed. On 5 October, Germany plans to host the second ‘Berlin Conference’. On top of all this, French President Macron signalled that Paris was seeking to hold their own ‘talks on Libya’. On 25 September, an Algerian newspaper reported that several African countries refused to accept the appointment of former Bulgarian politician and UN diplomat Mladenov as the new UN Special Envoy. On 23 September, EU foreign policy chief Borrell announced that the EU was lifting sanctions on head of the HoR, Saleh, and President of the GNC Abu-Sahmain.

On 17 September, details emerged of a Russian-brokered deal between the PC/GNA Deputy Prime Minister Maiteeq and Khalid Haftar, son of the head of the LNA. Also on 17 September, the UN released a statement welcoming Serraj’s announcement to resign. On 21 September, the EU imposed sanctions on 3 companies and 2 Libyan individuals.

On 14 September, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that consultations between Turkish and Russian interagency delegations on Libya and Syria will continue at a technical level. The same day, it was reported that the UNSC was planning on approving former Bulgarian politician and UN diplomat Nickolai Evtimov Mladenov as the new head of UNSMIL. On 10 September, participants of a two-day consultation held in Montreux, Switzerland under the auspices of the HD announced a supposed agreement on a roadmap for a comprehensive solution to the Libyan conflict. On 10 September, German and Italian warships intercepted an oil tanker on its way to Libya from the UAE suspected of carrying ‘a load of jet fuel likely to be used for military purposes.’

On 6 September, delegations representing the HoR and HCS met under the auspices of UNSMIL and Moroccan Foreign Minister, Bourita, in Morocco. On 7 September, head of the GNA, Serraj was received by Turkish President Erdogan in Istanbul for a closed-door meeting. On 2 September, the acting head of the UNSMIL, Williams, said to the UNSC that foreign supporters in Libya were helping stockpile weapons in breach of an arms embargo. On 1 September, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, Borrel, met with head of the GNA, Serraj and head of the HoR, Saleh to help advance the dialogue process in the country. On 1 September, Italian Foreign Minister di Maio made an unannounced visit to Libya, where he met separately with Serraj and Saleh.

On 27 August, the US and UN co-chaired a meeting regarding the Berlin Process on Libya. On 30 August, the head of the Arab League, Aboul-Gheit, met with Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams. On 29 August Williams, arrived in Cairo for a three-day visit to engage with various officials on the Libya crisis. On 28 August, Turkey announced that it would undertake military exercises off the northwest coast of Cyprus.

On 19 August, the OHCHR appointed three members of the independent fact-finding mission for Libya.

On 17 August, a German delegation led by Foreign Minister Maas began a two-day trip to Tripoli and Abu Dhabi. The same day Qatari Defence Minister, al-Attiyah, Turkish Defence Minister Akar travelled to Tripoli to meet with senior GNA officials. Also on 17 August, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan held a phone call. On 14 August, Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zakharova claimed that Russia and Turkey would be holding negotiations on Libya. On 12 August, US Ambassador Norland visited Ankara, where he met with senior Turkish officials.

On 4 August, US National Security Advisor O’Brien said President Trump had discussed the need to de-escalate the situation in Libya in phone calls with French President Macron, Egyptian President al-Sisi and Emirati Crown Prince Bin Zayed. On 7 August, a high-level US delegation held separate, virtual discussions with GNA National Security Advisor and HoR Foreign Affairs Committee Chair. On 10 August, Norland met with Egyptian officials in Cairo. On the same day, Norland met with HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh. On 6 August, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusolgu and Maltese Foreign Minister Bartolo met with al-Serraj. The same day, Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry and his Greek counterpart Dendias announced the signing of a maritime demarcation deal. On 10 August, Germany, France and Italy reportedly moved ahead with plans to impose sanctions on violators of the UN arms embargo.

On 30 July, the deputy spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Zaytsev, stated that Russia and Turkey would be holding a third round of consultations in Moscow. On 27 July, Turkish Defence Minister Akar said that continued external military support represents the ‘greatest obstacle to peace’ in Libya. On 30 July, the US House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee agreed to amendments to the ‘Libya Stabilisation Act’ and unanimously approved the bill. On 27 July, US Chargé d’Affaires Harris travelled to Misrata and two days later travelled to Benghazi. On 4 August, the German Hamburg frigate went to support the EU’s Operation Irini to enforce the UN arms embargo.

On 22 July, Turkey and Russia announced that they were working toward a ceasefire in Libya and would consider a joint working group on Libya, holding consultations in Moscow. The same day, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Shukry had held separate phone calls on Libya with his French and German counterparts. Also on 22 July, the spokesperson for the UNSG said that the UN was deeply concerned about the Egyptian Parliament’s recent decision to authorise the deployment of troops in Libya. On 18 July, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel and Italian Prime Minister Conte had issued a joint statement in threatening sanctions against violations to the UN arms embargo.

On 15 July, Turkish President Erdogan and US President Trump agreed to strengthen their cooperation on Libya. The same day, AFRICOM said it had verified photographic evidence of landmines and IEDs allegedly found in Tripoli that had been laid by the Russian Wagner Group. On 16 July, US State Department Assistant Secretary Schenker described the EU mission to stop arms shipments to Libya as not being ‘serious’ and accused the EU of being ‘biased’ for only criticising Turkey. On 17 July, France rebuffed Schenker’s assertions. On 19 July, Egyptian president Sisi held a phone call with US President Trump in which the two leaders reportedly agreed on maintaining a ceasefire. On 20 July, Egypt’s parliament authorised the deployment of Egyptian troops on combat missions outside the country.

On 9 July, the Egyptian military said it had carried out a large-scale military drill near the Libyan border called ‘Hasm 2020.’ On 13 July, the Turkish Foreign Minister said that military preparations had been made to seize Sirte and Jufra airbase if the LNA did not withdraw from both locations. On 10 July, Aqeela Saleh met with the acting UN Envoy to discuss finding an inclusive political solution to the Libyan crisis. On 8 July, Russian Foreign Minister said Russia was working with Turkey on an immediate ceasefire agreement in Libya.

On 3 July, a Turkish delegation made an unannounced visit to Tripoli to meet with senior GNA officials. On 1 July, France temporarily withdrew its participation from NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. On 3 July, the speaker of the HoR, Saleh, held a meeting in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov. On 1 July, a high-level US delegation undertook a meeting with LNA officials to discuss DDR initiatives. Also on 1 July, Saleh, met with Greek Foreign Minister, Dendias, in Tubruq.

On 25 June, a convoy of Russian and other foreign mercenaries entered Sharara oilfield. On 26 June, French President Macron had a meeting with Russian President Putin where the two discussed Libya. On 24 June, the US State Department met virtually with the GNA’s Ministry of Interior to discuss DDR. On 25 June, France, Italy and Germany released a joint statement calling for an end to foreign interference in Libya.

On 20 June, Egyptian President al-Sisi stated that Egypt has the legitimate right to intervene in Libya. In the wake of Sisi’s statements, many of the foreign actors involved in Libya have released statements. On 22 June, the US NSC stressed the need to build on the UN’s 5 +5 talks, the Cairo initiative, and the Berlin process. The same day, the head of the GNA, al-Serraj, hosted a closed-door meeting in Zuwara with a US AFRICOM delegation. Also on 22 June, the UNHRC adopted a resolution strongly condemning all acts of violence in Libya and urging the UN to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the country.

On 14 June, the planned talks on Libya between Russian FM Lavrov and Russian Defence Minister Shogu and their Turkish counterparts were delayed. On 10 June, Egyptian President al-Sisi and US President Trump spoke about the Libya file over the phone. The same day, UNSMIL said that the GNA and LNA delegations were “fully engaged” in the third round of JMC 5+5. On 12 June, the Turkish Ministry of Defence announced that it conducted an 8-hour long coordinated Open Sea Training exercise off the Libyan coast.

On 6 June, Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, flanked by the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, and Speaker of the HoR, Aqeela Saleh, announced a new peace initiative for Libya. Following this announcement, there has been a flurry of international activity and reaction.

On 29 May, the US State Department commended the Government of Malta’s for seizing counterfeit Libyan currency. On 30 May, Russia’s MFA issued a statement noting that a contract for the printing of Libyan dinars was signed in 2015. On 1 June, UNSG Guterres held a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 29 May, AFRICOM discussed training and exercise with Tunisia. On 30 May, Italian Prime Minister Conte spoke to the head of GNA, al-Serraj, and the next day he spoke to the head of the LNA, Haftar. On 1 June, French Foreign Minister Le Drian held a phone call with Serraj.

On 26 May, AFRICOM assessed that Russia had deployed military fighter aircraft to Libya. Just before, PMCs belonging to the Russian Wagner Group had entered Bani Walid and some were being evacuated by air to Jufra. Over the last week, politicians from the US, Turkey, UAE, France and the UN called for a political solution in Libya.

On 17 May, the Speaker of the HoR, Saleh, had a phone conversation with the German Ambassador Owcza. This followed exchanges with the Maltese and British Ambassadors. On 16 May, the head of the GNA, al-Serraj, held a phone call with the NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg. Just a day before, Serraj, held a phone call with Turkish President Erdogan. On 15 May, the second batch of Turkish medical supplies delivered through Tunisia’s Djerba Airport arrived in Tripoli.

On 7 May, the LNA launched shells within the vicinity of the GNA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Turkish and Italian Ambassadors’ residencies. On 11 May, the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece and the UAE issued a joint declaration in which they expressed concern over the current escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On 30 April, the GNA’s Foreign Minister issued a statement expressing deep concern to the French Foreign Ministry about the sighting of a French fighter jet over the skies of Misrata and Abu Grein. Throughout last week, most of the major international players in Libya have issued statements in reaction to LNA head Haftar’s speech on 27 April in which he declared he had the people’s mandate to abolish the LPA and establish military rule in Libya. The reactions of Haftar’s main backers, namely the UAE, Egypt and Russia, have varied.

On 23 April, the head of the HoR, Saleh called for support for political reform. On 27 April, the acting UN Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, welcomed Saleh’s political initiative. The US embassy in Libya reacted to Haftar’s televised address from 27 April.

On 16 April, Ramtane Lamamra, the former head of the AU’s Commission for Peace and Security and former Algerian Finance Minister, withdrew from the race to become the UN Special Envoy to Libya. On 14 April, Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov, claimed that the UNSC P5 have agreed to hold a summit. Over the course of the last week, politicians from the Eastern-based parallel administration had calls with Algerian and Russian officials respectively.

On 13 April, Russia allegedly sent Syrian fighters to Libya to fight for the LNA. The same day, the Sudanese MFA released a statement denying that any forces from its country were participating in the clashes in southern Tripoli or within Libya more broadly. This comes amid several photos circulating online claiming that Sudanese forces were killed on the Abu Grein axis.

On 2 April, the GNA’s Foreign Minister said that the new EU Operation Irini ignored air borders and eastern Libyan land borders. On 1 April, the LNA claimed that a Turkish frigate fired a missile at the Watiya airbase, while stationed off the north-western coast of Libya near Sabratha.

On 26 March, the EU launched Operation Irini to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya. In an open letter published on 27 March, the US Ambassador to Libya, called on the Libyan authorities to stop the fighting and on 24 March, the acting UN Special Envoy to Libya strongly condemned the grave violation of the “humanitarian pause”.

On 21 March, the UNSMIL welcomed the “positive responses” by the GNA and LNA to the ceasefire calls. However, fighting does not appear to have ceased on Tripoli’s southern frontlines. On 23 March, Serraj held a phone call with Italian Prime Minister Conte. On 18 March, the GNA’s Ministry of Interior announced that it would be signing a contract for the purchase of an Airbus 135 and Airbus 145.

Over the last week, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashaagha, travelled to France and the UK for meetings. Angela Merkel interacted with the leader of the LNA, Haftar and head of the GNA, Serraj emphasising the need to implement a permanent ceasefire. From 12 March, the current Deputy Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, will serve as the acting Envoy to Libya. UNSMIL also called for an immediate humanitarian cessation of hostilities to allow local authorities to respond to the spread of COVID-19.

On 9 March, Haftar met with French President Macron in France and travelled to Berlin on 10 March to meet with German officials. On 4 March, a high level international diplomatic delegation featuring representatives from France, Italy, and Germany met Haftar at his headquarters in Rajma.

On 1 March, a delegation from the pro-LNA government travelled to Syria where they signed multiple agreements of cooperation. On 2 March, the Libyan delegation met with Syrian President al-Assad. The same day, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, Salame, publicly resigned from his position.

Two separate lawsuits against Haftar are progressing in the US . On 22 February, Bashaagha said that the GNA would be willing to host a US military base in Libya. On 22 February, Erdogan said that two Turkish soldiers had died in Libya. On 20 February, Serraj attended a closed-door meeting with Erdogan in Istanbul. On 19 February, Russia’s defence minister Shoigu met with Haftar in Moscow.

On 11 February, the UNSC adopted resolution 2509 (2020) extending the authorization of measures against the illicit export of crude oil. On 12 February, the UNSC endorsed resolution 2510 supporting the key points of the final communique of the Berlin Conference. On 17 February, the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell announced that they agreed to establish a military mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya.

On 5 February, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boukadoum, met the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Rajma. On 6 February, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Bashaagha, met with a German government delegation. On 9 – 10 February, the UN-mediated “Economic and Financial Track” Dialogue took place in Cairo. On 10 February, US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, met with Bashaagha discussing the dismantlement of militias.

On 29 January, Salamé briefed the UNSC. On 29 January, the Turkish government confirmed it had four frigates and a refuelling vessel in the central Mediterranean. The same day, Macron accused Turkey of violating the Berlin conference. On 30 January, Algerian Prime Minister Djerad proposed that his country host a Libya “reconciliation forum” on behalf of the AU. On 2 February, Algeria’s President, Tebboune, proposed a meeting for Libya’s multiple “tribes” to be held in a regional country in order to create a solution to the current Libya crisis.

On 23 January, Algerian Foreign Minister Boukadoum held a meeting with foreign ministers from Mali, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia, the latter five nations sharing a common border with Libya. On 23 January, Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis stated the EU would not agree to a political solution to the Libya crisis while the GNA and Turkey maintain their maritime MoU. On 26 January, Turkish President Erdogan, met with Algerian Prime Minister, Tebboune, in Algeria. On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Maas met EU High Representative Borrell to discuss the situation in Libya. On 27 January, UNSMIL issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya”.

On 19 January, Germany held an international conference on Libya in Berlin including multiple state leaders and high-level delegates. The conference concluded with unanimous agreement on a final 55-point communiqué. The communiqué called for the UNSC to create an international committee to monitor the ceasefire and to impose sanctions on violations of the ceasefire.

On 8 January, Turkey and Russia jointly called for a ceasefire in Libya from 12 January. UN Envoy to Libya, Salame, welcomed the ceasefire and called upon the international community to make the most of the momentum to help reach a consensus through the “Berlin process”. On 8 January, Serraj refused to see Italian Prime Minister Conte after learning that Haftar had also been invited and received by the Italian leader. On 9 January, a delegation of senior US officials, met in Rome with Bashaagha and Haftar. On 11 January, Russian President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel met in Moscow to discuss Libya. On 14 January, Merkel’s office announced that she had agreed with the UN to go ahead with holding the Berlin conference on 19 January.

On 1 January, the Arab League convened an exceptional meeting in Cairo but failed to reach a consensus on how to de-escalate the conflict in Libya. On 2 January, Turkey’s parliament approved a bill to enable troops to be deployed to Libya to support the GNA. On 2 January, Egyptian President al-Sisi condemned in the “strongest terms” the Turkish parliament’s authorization. On 6 January, the GNA announced that a planned visit to Tripoli on 7 January by the newly appointed diplomat-in-chief of the EU Joseph Borrell and the foreign ministers of the UK, France, Germany and Italy had been postponed. On 6 January, Serraj arrived in Algeria to meet with the newly-elected Algerian President Tebboune.

On 17 December, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Libya and met with Serraj and Haftar. On 21 December, a senior US State Department official said that the US is “very concerned” about the intensification of the conflict in Libya. On 23 December, the EU issued a statement reiterating its calls on all Libyan parties to cease all military actions and resume the political dialogue. On 24 December, a high-profile meeting gathered together representatives from the Russian and Turkish foreign ministries. On 25 December, Turkish President Erdogan paid a surprise visit to Tunisia and met with Tunisian President Saied. On 28 December, Italian Prime Minister Conte warned that Russia and Turkey, and not Europe, are setting the agenda in Libya’s conflict. On 29 December, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said that Greece wants to be included in the UN-sponsored Berlin conference on the Libya conflict. On 29 December UN Envoy to Libya, Salamé, called for greater civilian protection following several incidents in western Libya.

On 12 December, the European Council condemned the maritime deal between the GNA and Turkey. On 14 December, the Security and Military MoU was introduced to the Turkish parliament. On 15 December, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with high-level representatives of Qatar as well as US Republican senator Lindsay Graham. On 16 December, Turkey claimed that Russian President Putin suggested working jointly in Libya.

On 7 December, US Army General, Stephen Townsend stated that he believed Russian air defence systems were responsible for shooting down an American unarmed drone over Tripoli in November. On 5 December, the text of the maritime agreement between the GNA and Turkey was published. On 6 December, the Greek Foreign Ministry stated it had given the GNA’s Ambassador to Greece 72 hours to leave the country.

On 27 November, the GNA signed an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey, along with an MoU to expand security and military cooperation. On 2 December, Speaker of the Tubruq-based HoR demanded to have the MoU retracted. On 2 December, the UNSC issued a statement expressing their “deep concern at the recent escalation of violence in Libya”.

On 21 November, members of the US Senate introduced a piece of legislation called ‘the Libya Stabilization Act’. Former Libyan ambassador to the UAE, Aref al-Nayed, met with US NSC officials twice ‘this fall’. On 21 November, an AFRICOM unarmed remotely piloted aircraft was lost over Tripoli. On 20 November, an Italian Air Force MQ-9A Predator B crashed near the city of Tarhouna.

On 14 November, the US State Department released a statement directly addressing the LNA and calling on it to “end its offensive on Tripoli.” On 13 November, representatives of the US State Department started a US-Libya Security Dialogue in Washington, DC with the GNA.

In an interview on 4 November, Haftar said that Qatari and Turkish support to the GNA will probably delay his troops’ advances and framed foreign support for the LNA as counterterrorism cooperation. He wished the Berlin conference success if it ever took place.

On 3 November, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, met in London. On 2 November, Italy’s deal with the GNA on migration was automatically renewed without amendments. The GNA and UN formally reopened Mitiga airport on 29 October and said that they planned to resume flights in the next two weeks.

On 26 October, US Embassy officials travelled to Benina to meet with notable eastern figures and discuss efforts to end the fighting around Tripoli and seek justice for US victims of the 11 September 2012 attack in Benghazi. On 27 October, the German foreign minister and UN Envoy discussed the Berlin conference in Tripoli. Russia hosted its first Africa summit which was attended by Serraj and eastern government representatives.

On 16 October, NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah met with key US officials in Washington to discuss the potential increase of oil outputs, investment opportunities and transparency in the Libyan oil sector. On 16 October, the chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs panel on the Middle East introduced a proposal “to clarify and strengthen American policy in support of a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the Libyan conflict.”

The planned “Berlin Conference” on Libya will be delayed until at least November. On 11 October, the UN Envoy to Libya said he remained hopeful that the Berlin Conference would lead to a UN Security Council resolution preventing foreign countries from escalating the crisis in Libya, as well as the implementation of mechanisms to enforce the arms embargo.

On 6 October, UNSMIL published a statement condemning airstrikes on the Equestrian Club in Tripoli’s Janzour neighbourhood. On 4 October, UNSMIL issued a statement expressing alarm at “indications that parallel, unrecognized authorities in Libya” are threatening the NOC and its subsidiary Brega.

On 26 September, France and Italy co-chaired a ministerial meeting on Libya on the sidelines of the UNGA. The meeting was attended by representatives from the US, the UK, the UAE, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, China, the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the African Union.

On 18 September, Conte and Macron met in Rome to discuss cooperation on Libya. On 19 September, US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland met with the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Dubai. On 23 September, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said France will chair a meeting on Libya on 26 September on the side lines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

On 11 September, Germany’s ambassador to Libya announced that Germany would host a conference on Libya in conjunction with the UN as a follow on to this year’s General Assembly discussions. On 15 September, the UK appointed Nicholas Hopton as its new chargé d’affaires.

On 8 September, the French newspaper Liberation published an interview with UN Special Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, who stated his belief that a political agreement between the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar and the Government of National Accord was “conceivable”.

On 26 August, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with the new Commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen Townsend, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland. On 30 August, Norland met with the head of the High Council of State (HCS), Khalid al-Mishri. On 29 August, the UN published a report outlining the UNSG overview of the Libyan crisis as presented to the UN Security Council.

On 23 August, France, UK, US, Italy, Egypt and the UAE met as a part of the P3+3 countries in Paris to “study and evaluate the security and financial conditions in Libya.” On 26 August, the G7 summit in France released a statement calling for an international conference on Libya.

The new US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, assumed his duties on 14 August. The UN investigated and condemned a LNA airstrike on Zuwara airport on 15 August.

On 8 August, the UN Envoy briefed the UNSC on the state of the planned UN-brokered ceasefire for Eid al-Adha. On 10 August, Turkey issued a statement in support of the ceasefire. On 12 August, France, Italy, the UAE, the UK and the US issued a joint statement in support of the UN’s efforts.

On 1 August, Haftar met with Sisi in Cairo to discuss security cooperation, On 4 August, Macron and Sisi had a phone call in which they discussed Libya. On 5 August, the UNSC said members “welcomed and expressed full support” for a proposed truce for Eid.

On 29 July, in a lengthy address to the UNSC, the UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame proposed a three-part immediate action to end the current conflict. On 28 July, Salame met with the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, at his headquarters in Rajma, in eastern Libya.

On 22 July, UNSMIL announced the reopening of bids for the selection of an international audit firm to audit the financial accounts of the competing Central Bank of Libya CBL branches.

On 16 July, the Governments of Egypt, France, Italy, UAE, UK, and the US issued a statement calling for an immediate de-escalation and halt to the current fighting. On 11 July, the UN Deputy Envoy to Libya, met with the senior leadership of the eastern-based CBL. On 8 July, the Javelin anti-tank missiles discovered amidst LNA forces in Ghariyan were confirmed to belong to France.

On 7 July, the UN’s Deputy Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, met with members of the eastern-based HoR as part of a 3-day tour of eastern Libya. On 5 July, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj visited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul. On 5 July, UNSC issued a statement condemning the attack on 2 July on a migrant detention centre in Tajoura. On 3 July, details emerged of the GNA Attorney General arresting two Russian men accused of attempting to influence future Libyan elections.

On 28 June, the LNA banned all commercial flights from Libya to Turkey. On 29 June, the Turkish Foreign Ministry demanded the release of six Turkish citizens by the LNA “otherwise the elements of Haftar will become a legitimate target.” On 29 June, the US State and Defence Departments opened an investigation to look into how American-made weapons had found their way to Libya.

On 20 June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirms Turkey is providing GNA with military equipment. On 22 June, UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi.

On 12 June, foreign ministers from Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia held a meeting where they called for all belligerents involved in the fighting in Tripoli to stop and return to a political solution. On 13 June, Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi met eastern-based parallel House of Representative Speaker Aguila Saleh in Egypt.

On 7 June, a bipartisan group of eight members of the US House of Representatives sent an open letter to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asking the White House to clarify its Libya position. On 10 June, the UNSC unanimously extended authorisation for vessels suspected of carrying arms to Libya to be intercepted.

On 31 May, the Tripoli-based US embassy Charge d’Affaires issued a statement, saying the US is “deeply concerned” about the shelling of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) clinic in Tripoli. On 3 June, NOC chairman, Mustafa Sanallah met with various senior European Union (EU) diplomats in Tripoli.

On 22 May, the head of the LNA Khalifa Haftar met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris. On 23 May, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with Algerian interim President, Abdelkader Bensalah, in Algiers. On 22 May, Serraj held a meeting with Tunisian President, Beji Caid Essebsi, to discuss the current crisis in Libya.

On 21 May, the UN Envoy to Libya gave a stark address to the UN Security Council. He warned that Libya is on the verge of descending into a civil war “which could lead to the permanent division of the country”. He added that the damage already done will take years to mend, and that’s only if the war is ended now.

On 10 May, the Prime Minister of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, concluded a visit to the heads of state in Germany, France, Italy and the UK. On 10 May, the UNSC held an emergency session focusing on the instability in Libya and the need for humanitarian action. On 13 May, the European Union Council released a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire. On 13 May, the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, met with the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

On 5 May, UNSMIL called for a week-long humanitarian truce to start on 6 May at 4:00am (local time), coinciding with the beginning of Ramadan.

On 24 April, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in Rome. Salame called for Italy and all UN member states to push for a ceasefire and the return to dialogue, stressing that dialogue “is the only possible way to avoid the catastrophe.” He added that the National Conference, although impossible at present, remains essential in the long run. On 29 April, during a visit to Paris, Salame openly criticised Haftar. He is quoted as saying: “He is no Abraham Lincoln, he is no big democrat … Seeing him act, we can be worried about his methods because where he is governing, he doesn’t govern softly, but with an iron fist.”

On 15 April, US President Donald Trump had a phone conversation with Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar. On 22 April, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj played down the conversation between Haftar and Trump, saying that while he hadn’t spoken to Trump his engagement with the US administration suggested they opposed his military actions.

On 10 April, UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé stated he was postponing the National Conference due to take place on 14-16 April. On 13 April, Salamé release a statement indicating the UN had not given up the prospect of a political solution to end the clashes. On 15 April, Salame told the BCC that “I’m just as worried by the crack in the UN Security Council as the fighting on the ground.”

On 3 April, airstrikes occurred in the Uweinat area close to the Libya-Egypt border, targeting alleged terrorists. No country has claimed responsibility for the airstrikes.

On 30 March, the so-called Libya Quartet met on the side-lines of the 30th Arab League Summit. On 27 March, Libyan National Army (LNA) head Khalifa Haftar visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On 27 March, the Chadian government announced it has established a security force in its Tibesti Province to patrol its Libyan border.

On 22 March, the US State Department warned of an imminent attack on a vital national institution in Tripoli on 23 March. On 25 March, the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) reviewed its flight ban over Libyan airspace and is set to allow US carriers to fly over the country above 30,000 feet. On 20 March, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame announced the details of the long-delayed National Conference.

On 20 March, the UN envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, announced that the UN National Conference will take place in Ghadames on 14-16 April. On 13 March, several ambassadors met with GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and members of the HCS. On 18 March, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Tripoli. On 19 March, US ambassador to Libya Peter Bodde and US AFRICOM commander Thomas Waldhauser flew into Tripoli to meet with Serraj. On 16 March, Deputy UN Envoy Stephanie Williams made a visit to the electoral district of Aziziyya, south-west of Tripoli.