Libyan actors

On 29 March, Haftar states that within two weeks there will be a unified government in Libya. On 31 March, the LNA’s 155 Battalion, declared to the LNA Central Command its readiness for mobilising. On 30 March, elections for nine of the 69 municipals councils in southern and western Libya took place.

On 20 March, the Government of National Accord (GNA) officially endorsed the new 2019 budget.

On 17 March, the eastern-based Interim government’s launched a security operation to remove “terrorists and criminals” from Libya’s South. On 13 March, al-Bunyan al-Marsous spokesman stated that an attack on Sirte by the LNA would be a declaration of war. On 15 March, the LNA released three Zawiyyan prisoners from Qirnada Prison in eastern Libya. On 18 March, the PC has agreed on a budget of around 48.6 billion LYD for 2019.

On 10 March, the LNA took control over the Abu Hadi Checkpoint, south of Sirte. The GNA aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) announced a state of emergency in response and mobilised additional forces east and south of Sirte. On 7 March, the LNA’s 73 Brigade observed ‘hostile elements’ making their way through to the Murzuq area. On 9 March, Chadian Interior Minister held a meeting with the LNA and Tebu tribes to secure the common border. On 6 March, GNA spokesperson held a press conference to give further details about the so-called ‘Abu Dhabi Dialogue’,

On 3 March, the LNA claimed it had entered the town of Qatrun. On 28 February, the High Social Council of the Libyan Tuareg announced that the LNA had peacefully entered Ghat and al-Awenat. On 1 March, the LNA officially confirmed its control over Umm al-Aranib. On 4 March, the NOC officially lifted force majeure on Sharara oilfield.

On 20 February, the LNA claimed to have taken control of Murzuq after clashes with the South Protection Force. On 21 February, the Libyan National Army (LNA) announced that it had taken over the security of al-Feel oilfield without any fighting. On 23 February, the LNA’s Tariq bin Zayed Battalion was involved in clashes in the Umm al-Aranib area against Chadian militias.

On 13 February, the GNA claimed that it had coordinated an airstrike with joint U.S.-Libyan forces targeting al-Qaeda members near Awbari. The Libyan National Army (LNA) has begun the second phase of its ‘Operation Southern Liberation’ this week, advancing on Umm al-Aranib and launching airstrikes in the Murzuq area.

On 7 February, the LNA extended its reach towards the Sharara and al-Feel oilfields. On 9 February, the LNA air force carried out airstrikes near al-Feel airstrip. On 11 February, a deal was struck between the LNA and the unit that currently guards Sharara. On 8 February, the TPF announced that it would be integrating into a new, larger coalition and the 301 Brigade took positions in southern Tripoli.

The Libyan National Army (LNA) mobile force continued to advance southward into the Murzuq region last week. On 30 January, LNA spokesman stated that the LNA now has three axes of connection to Libya’s western region coinciding with several declarations of support for the LNA in the region. On 2 February, the GNA’s Chief of Staff stated that the GNA was not coordinating with the LNA in the south.

On 23 January, the LNA spokesman Ahmed al-Mismari labelled UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame as an ‘opponent.’ The military campaign launched by the LNA to exert its control over the southern region made notable progress. On 26 January, the head of the HSC Khalid al-Mishri resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood.

On 21 January, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the TPR and the 7th Brigade following clashes in southern Tripoli. Over the last week, the Libyan National Army (LNA) has continued to consolidate its presence in and around Sebha as a part of its campaign to secure the southern region.

On 15 January, LNA confirmed that an operation to liberate southern Libya from “terrorist” groups is underway. On 8 January, the LNA’s Military Police Brigade was deployed to Ras Lanuf and Brega to facilitate security in the Oil Crescent. On 8 January, three Presidential Council members instructed all government staff to cease supporting PC head Fayez al-Serraj.

On 3 January, the Attorney General issued warrants for 31 members of Chadian and Sudanese opposition groups and 6 Libyan nationals.

On 29 December, the Directors of security in Tripoli and Benghazi met in Benghazi to discuss unification. On 27 December, a Chadian rebel militia attacked the LNA’s 10th Brigade leaving one dead and 12 more wounded at Taraghin.

On 19 December, the LNA undertook a pre-emptive attack on Ibrahim Jadhran. On 22 December, the east-based Interim Government declared a state of high alert in Benghazi. On 18 December, four Tripoli militias announced their merger.

Over the last week, the LNA deployed a significant amount of forces to the Oil Crescent. On 12 December, the Security Information Unit Tripoli Branch announced it had begun enacting new joint security operations in Tripoli.

On 4 December, the LNA stated that they had removed “terrorist” elements from the area around Tazirbu. On 4 December, notable deployments of LNA forces to the Oil Crescent began that continued throughout the week.

On 29 November, the HoR handed over the Constitution Referendum Law to the HNEC.

On 26 November, the HoR passed the referendum constitutional amendment and approved the restructuring of the PC. On 22 November, the LIA said it will appoint auditors to undertake a wide-ranging examination of its assets.

On 14 November, it was announced that Hashem Abedi will be extradited to the UK. On 14 November, the 7th Brigade from Tarhuna clashed with Abu Salim Central Security forces in Tripoli. On 15 November, the Security Operations Room of Sabratha arrested the former head of the Sabratha Military Council.

On 7 November, the Governors of competing Central Banks of Libya reach a consensus on audit terms. On 8 November, the High Council of State (HSC) called for a review of the reforming of the executive authority.

On 31 October, the HoR and HSC handed over a final agreement on the restructuring of the PC to UNSMIL. On 30 October, the Libyan National Army stated that it was launching a final assault against the Derna Protection Force. On 4 October, the Anti-ISIS Operations Room clashed with the Anas Dabbashi Brigade in Sabratha.

On 29 October, the HoR and the HCS announced that they had come to an agreement to reorganize the Presidential Council. On 27 October, the Presidential Council issued a statement announcing the approval of the new security arrangements in the Greater Tripoli area.

On 17 October, Libyan military unification talks resumed in Cairo. The discussions, mediated by Egypt, ended with no formal declaration, resolutions or agreements. On 19 October, the LNA launched Operation “Hawd Murzuq” in an attempt to remove rebel armed groups from southern Libya.

On 13 October, the LNA launched airstrikes on a convoy of Chadian mercenaries in the southern Tmassah area. On 14 October, fighting occurred between a coalition composed of the Khalid Bin Walid brigade and the Waw brigade against and a Chadian militia east of Tmassah.

On 6 October, the GNA and its new UN-backed Security Arrangements Committee announced new security arrangements in Tripoli. On 7 October, the GNA announced a reshuffle of its cabinet and assigned several new ministers.

Following the conclusion of clashes in Tripoli on 25 September, the GNA is moving to redraw security arrangements in the capital through the UN facilitated Security Arrangements Committee of Greater Tripoli. In light of this the GNA Local Government Minister is hosting a meeting of municipal mayors on 2 October to discuss decentralisation and the devolution of security functions to municipalities.

On 25 September, a ceasefire was brokered between the Tripoli Protection Force and Tarhuna’s 7th Brigade that saw the latter withdraw to the areas of control agreed in the UN-brokered ceasefire of 9 September. This coincided with forces under the command of Salah Badi retreating withdrawing from the Airport road.

On 18 September, hostilities erupt between militia groups south of Tripoli despite UN ceasefire. On 17 September, the security of Tripoli’s Mitigia airport had been handed over to the Central Security Forces. On 16 September, the GNA form joint force under the leadership of the commander of the western military zone.

On 9 September, UNSMIL gathered together the key rival factions involved in the militia clashes in Tripoli that began on 26 August to sign an eight-point agreement that included a pledge to refrain from extorting sovereign institutions. This is the second meeting in over a fortnight, with the first initiating the current ceasefire.

Major conflict erupted between militias in Tripoli on 27 August that has expanded over the following days into what seems to be a semi-coordinated military campaign aimed at eradicating the power of Tripoli-based militias, by an alliance of forces primarily including Tarhuna, Misrata and Zintan.

On 26 August, the Kani militia (also known as the 7th ‘Liwa’) deployed from Tarhuna to south Tripoli. The move provoked Tripoli armed groups to deploy reinforcements to these fronts. On 27 August, clashes broke out between the militias south of Tripoli. A temporary ceasefire held on 28 August but the situation remains volatile.

On 15 August, the LNA mobilized its forces to the Oil Crescent and declared a state of emergency in the region following reports of Ibrahim Jadhran allied militias traversing to the Wadi Zamzam area.

On 14 August, the House of Representatives (HoR) held its fourth session to date to discuss and vote on the legislation for a constitutional referendum.

On 1 August, the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) killed a man thought to be from the al-Burga militia in the Tajoura area of Tripoli. On 2 August, forces under Ghneiwa al-Kikli captured a clothes and textile factory in the Al-Hadba al-Badry area of Tripoli. On 31 July and 1 August, a series of clashes occurred between the Surman CID and the al-Nasr militia.

On 26 July, the first unofficial joint patrol between the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) 128 brigade and the Sirte Protection Force (SPF) was conducted along the Sirte-Jufra road. This region has seen multiple reports of recent of ISIS activity.

On 18 July, Fathi al-Majbary announced from Benghazi that he would no longer be a member of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Presidential Council (PC), calling the GNA a ‘farce’ and arguing that no central government could be run from Tripoli due to the influence the militias there.

On 10 July, Khalifa Haftar ordered all LNA-affiliated Petroleum Facilities Guards to allow oil ports under their control to resume exports under the authority of the Tripoli-based NOC and its subsidiaries. On 11 July, the NOC lifted force majeure on all of the Oil Crescent ports and Tobruq’s Hariga port.

On 6 July, the GNA issued a decree instating the commander of the Zintan Special Operations Force, Emad Trabelsi, as the President of the General Security Directorate. On 7 July, clashes took between Abdelghani al-Kikli aka Ghneiwa forces from Abu Slim and a former militia leader under his command.

On 2 July, the internationally-recognised National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on crude exports from Zueitina and Hariga oil ports. The NOC’s latest move comes in response to the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) decision on 25 June to transfer control of the Oil Crescent oil ports to the parallel Benghazi-based NOC.

On 25 June, the LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari stated that Khalifa Haftar had ordered that the all ports ‘liberated’ from Ibrahim Jadhran forces on 21 June by the LNA were to be handed over to the Benghazi-based National Oil Corporation, under the auspices of the Bayda-based parallel (interim) government led by Abdullah al-Thinni.

On 14 June, forces under the command of Ibrahim Jadhran attacked and took control of Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil ports from Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces. Large LNA units are currently being deployed to Brega and Ajdabiya for the counter offensive.

On 9 June, four suspected ISIS fighters were detained as part of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) operation “Nation Storm.” On 9 May, the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Operations Commander stated that they intended the Derna siege to end by mid al-Fitr, which is expected to fall on 15 June.

On 31 May, an armed group reportedly composed of Tebu and members of the defunct Benghazi Defence Brigades attacked Teminhint airbase controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA). Reports indicate that the LNA’s 116th Battalion repelled the attack after three hours of fighting. On 3 June, delegates from Misrata and Tawergha signed a reconciliation and return agreement that will see as many as 40,000 Tawerghan internally displaced persons (IDP) return to their homes.

On 24 May, a VBIED attack occurred in Benghazi killing at least six people and wounded 22 others. The motives and the perpetrators remain unknown. On 25 May, the commander of the LNA’s 21 Saiqa Brigade claimed to have survived an assassination attempt in Benghazi. On 28 May, the LNA Air force claim to have struck multiple “Chadian militias” in southern Libya.

On 11 May, the Presidential Council (PC) in Tripoli announced a decree that would significantly expand the powers of the Special Deterrent Forces (Rada). The GNA’s MoI established a new force called the ‘Special Operations Force’ (SOF). On 11 May, the Libyan Air Force had conducted strikes on fuel smugglers sites on the Libyan-Tunisian border. On 12 May, Tebu fighters managed to advance and take control of vital locations in south Sebha from their rivals the Awlad Suliman.

On 7 May, LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar announced that ‘peace efforts’ with the DMSC, which controls Derna, had failed and that the ‘zero hour’ for the ‘liberation’ of Derna had begun. The LNA has claimed that it has made advancements on all fronts in Derna. On 7 May, 7,000 LNA officers conducted a military parade for the 4th anniversary of “Operation Dignity” at Benghazi’s Benina airbase.

On 26 April, Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar landed at Benghazi. On 27 April, the Awlad Suliman Tribal Council in Sebha issued a statement welcoming Haftar’s return and declaring loyalty and readiness to support him. On 25 April, a delegation from the city of Zintan paid a return visit to Misrata, where delegates from both cities signed a reconciliation agreement.

On 21 April, the LNA said its jets conducted three airstrikes targeting militias near Bani Walid. On 22 April, clashes broke out between police members affiliated with the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and LNA-Special Forces fighters in Benghazi. On 20 April, an LNA reconnaissance desert unit and 116th Infantry Battalion arrested two militants in southern Libya.

On 10 April, unconfirmed reports began circulating that that Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, after losing consciousness in Benghazi, was rushed to Amman in Jordan then transferred to the Val-de-Grace hospital in Paris, France. On 11 April, the HoR President Agilah Saleh accepted the invitation of the new head of the Tripoli-based High State Council, Khaled Mishri, to meet for reconciliation talks.

On 9 April, the spokesperson for Presidential Council (PC) reported that the PC’s new anti-terrorist operation had completely removed all elements of terrorist organizations in its operation area. On 8 April, Khalid Mishri was elected as the President of the High Council of State. On 4 April, a Libyan delegation met with representatives from Sudan, Niger, and Chad in the Niger and made an agreement to create a cooperation mechanism to secure common borders.

On 28 March, a meeting was held in Zintan between representatives from the western Libyan towns of Zintan and Misrata. The meeting concluded with the scheduling of a follow up meeting in Misrata and the production of a six point communiqué of shared objectives. On 29 March, the Libyan National Army (LNA) undertook airstrikes on a Chadian militant group checkpoint in southern Libya.

On 20 March, the sixth round of discussions aimed at unifying Libya’s military concluded in Cairo. On 19 March, Zintan Special Forces led by Emad Trabilsi took control of the 27km checkpoint on the main Tripoli-Zawiyya coastal road. On 21 March, a so-called “Ceasefire Committee” created by the Presidential Council arrived in Sebha to negotiate peace between the clashing Awlad Sulieman and Tebu tribes.

On 18 March, the sixth round of discussions, mediated by Egypt, aimed at unifying Libya’s military began in Cairo. On 14 March, a High Council of State (HCS) convoy, that included its chairman Abdul-Rahman al-Swehli, was fired upon at the Najah checkpoint in the Nafousa Mountains near Gwalish.

On 13 March, clashes continued in Sebha between Tebu and Awlad Suliman militias. On 12 March, UN envoy Ghassan Salame met with a delegation from southern Libya in Tripoli to explore ways of resolving the violence in southern Libya. On 9 March the LNA declared that all “Africans from neighbouring countries” had to leave Libya by 17 March or they would be expelled by force.

On 6 March, local sources reported clashes between Tebu and Awlad Suliman militias involving tanks in the Nasriya area of Sebha, north of the airport. Fighting between the two groups has also intensified in the Tayuri district of Sebha, an area populated with Tebu and Tuareg groups.

On 26 February, Libya’s National Human Rights Commission confirmed that two civilians have been killed in clashes between Awlad Suliman’s 6th Brigade and Tebu militias in Sabha. On 21 February, a prominent militia leader from Warshefana was killed in an arrest operation in the al-Maya district west of Tripoli, leading to the coastal road being closed.

On 15 February, in Tripoli Serraj dismissed the current GNA Minister of Interior al-Aref al-Khoja from his post and replaced him with his deputy minister Brigadier Abdussalam Ashour. The GNA also promoted Sabratha’s Anti ISIS Operation Room Commander Omar Abdul Jalil to Brigadier General and is actively reorganising security architecture Sirte. On 14 February, the Supreme Court in Tripoli ruled in favour of the CDA’s draft constitution.

On 7 February, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, a LNA commander wanted on charges of war crimes by the ICC, handed himself into the LNA for questioning. On 11 February, the LNA affiliated AIOR apprehended a group allegedly plotting to conduct car bombs attacks in Sabratha. On 6 February, the LNA said it had arrested an extremist cell allegedly preparing VBIEDs in the Oil Crescent.

On 1 February, members of the mostly Misratan-staffed Central Region Zone intercepted a convoy of Tawerghan IDPs travelling from Ajdabiya near Bin Jawwad and prevented them from travelling any further west towards their hometown. The incident has received local and international condemnation given an ‘agreement’ was signed ensuring the IDPs could return to their hometown from 1 February.

On 24 January, Mahmoud al-Werfalli publicly executed 10 people imprisoned by the LNA in Benghazi following a double bomb attack in the city. On 26 January, 5 more bodies of accused jihadists were found in Lithi. On 24 January, GNA forces arrested 6 people accused of trafficking and torturing Sudanese migrants south of Sirte.

On 21 January, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed Mismari said that the LNA has carried out airstrikes on Sudanese and Chadian opposition fighters in the south east of Libya, near to Rabiana, as part of Operation Desert Fury. A convoy of 15 vehicles was reportedly hit, with some reports indicating Egyptian support was involved.

On 15 January, major clashes in Tripoli occurred between anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) and pro-Government of National Accord (GNA) militias at Mitiga airport. The attack was reportedly part of a ‘prison break’ assault by the anti-LNA militias from Tajoura (east Tripoli). As many as 20 people were killed and more than 60 injured as a result of the fighting.

GNA aligned forces triggered clashes with local militias near Zuwara’s Abu Kammash area on 5-6 January. The clashes ended on 8 January after an agreement was made over security arrangements for control of the land border and Zuwara port. On 6 January, the GNA affiliated ‘Kani brigade’ took control of the Garabulli coastal checkpoint before withdrawing.

On 27 December, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed Mismari reaffirmed the LNA’s commitment to elections provided HNEC is restructured. The following day Haftar insisted that if elections don’t come to pass there is no way ‘but authorisation’ of the LNA to take power.

On 19 December, the House of Representatives voted for a new Central Bank of Libya (CBL) governor, replacing incumbent Al-Seddiq Al-Kabir with former Deputy Governor Mohammed Al-Shukri. The UN Special Mission in Libya has rejected the appointment saying that it violates article 15 of the Libyan Political Agreement and must be done within its accord. […]

The 17 December ‘expiry’ date of the LPA was marked by an official television announcement from Khalifa Haftar declaring the LPA and its institutions expired. Haftar also endorsed ‘elections’ as the only legitimate expression of the Libyan people’s will. The same day, Misrata’s municipal mayor Mohammed Eshtewi was abducted and killed shortly after landing in the city on a flight from Turkey.

On 6 December, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame co-chaired the official launch of the voter registration process for elections in 2018. On 8 December, almost all of Libya’s mayors and municipal councils met in Tunis. The newly formed ’17 December’ movement called for civil disobedience in Tripoli and for LNA control of the city.

On 3 December, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo where he said they discussed the importance of elections for Libya’s future. The two men also discussed efforts to combat terrorism, the current economic crisis, and the recent Cairo meetings between Libyan National Army (LNA) officials and their counterparts from […]

On 20 November, the HoR voted to approve the proposed amendments to the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). On 23 November, the HCS President Swehli issued a statement rejecting the HoR vote. On 27 November, UN Envoy Salame began a whirlwind tour of Libya visiting Tripoli, Misrata and he plans to visit Benghazi on 29 November.

The UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame made a case to the UN Security Council on 15 November that the Libyan political process was on track. However, President of the HCS Abdurrahman al-Swehli criticised Salame for ‘ignoring’ consensus and ‘partnership’. On 19 November, a delegation of 29 HoR members was not allowed to land in Tubruq airport. The delegation was reportedly intending to vote on the new LPA amendment.

On 10 November, the GNA military campaign against LNA-affiliated 4th Brigade in Wershefana concluded ‘successfully’. On 11 November, 28 bodies were discovered with bullet wounds and torture marks in Wershefana. On 10 November, Faraj Gaem, GNA deputy MoI in Benghazi, accused the LNA of trying to assassinate him, leading the LNA to arrest him and ban all GNA officials from eastern Libya.

On 1 November, a new GNA-supported military campaign was launched in Wershefana against LNA-affiliated forces. It is led by Usama al-Juwaili and includes units from Zintan, Tarhouna, and Tripoli. Talks in Egypt last week to unify the Libyan armed forces have stalled following the ‘mystery’ Derna airstrikes.

On 30 October, airstrikes of unknown origin hit the Dahr al-Hamar and al-Fatieh districts of Derna. The strikes killed at least 12 children and women, and injured many more. Both the LNA and the Egyptian military have denied responsibility for the incident. The LNA said it had set an internal six-month deadline to conclude the ongoing UN dialogue talks or else the LNA would move on Tripoli. Clashes broke out in the center of Zawiyya and near the oil refinery on the evening of 30 October.

Since taking control over Sabratha in early October, Khalifa Haftar has strengthened his relationship with several important military leaders in the west of Libya. This week Misratan General Salem Juha, endorsed Haftar as leader of the national army. It is reported that Haftar met with the GNA’s Commander of the Western Region during his trip to the UAE earlier last week. On October 20, a large militia in Sabratha, the Sareyyat al-Orouba, turned itself over to the LNA-affiliated AIOR. On 17 October, intense clashes erupted at Tripoli port after the GNA’s Presidential Guard and the Nawasi Brigade tried to take the port by force. The Presidential Guard secured the facility on 22 October, and it is now operational. On October 19, the Megarha tribe cut off water supplies to Tripoli, in an effort to secure the release of Mabrouk al-Hniesh from Rada Special Deterrence Force.

On 6 October a militia affiliated with theLNA, expelled the Anas Dabbashi militia from Sabratha and Mellitah Oil and Gas Complex, with the approval of the GNA. Local communities who support the LNA victory are demonstrating against the Sabratha Municipal Council, and are demanding that the mayor to resign. On 14 October, Haftar gave a speech at a gathering of security officials in Benghazi, and said that it was unlikely that the UN led political path was the only way forward, instead implying that a military solution “approved by the people” remains possible.

On 6 October, the Anti-ISIS Operations Room, a force friendly with both GNA and LNA authorities, announced its control of Sabratha after defeating the Anas Dabbashi Brigade following three weeks of intense fighting that ultimately left 39 people dead and 300 others wounded. HoR meeting to discuss the LPA planned for 9 October, was postponed after protestors blocked the building entrances.

The clashes between the Dabbashi brigade and the more pro-LNA Anti-ISIS Operation Room have continued unabated in Sabratha with use of heavy artillery, despite attempts by different actors to establish a ceasefire. So far, 26 people have been killed, 170 wounded and thousands displaced from the city centre. In Tripoli, 2 Nawasi fighters were killed by Tajouri’s forces, sparking tensions.

Protests led by Basit Igtet in Marytrs square drew crowds but not as many as expected and the protest appeared to fizzle out without incident. Clashes in Sabratha between Dabbashi and Anti-ISIS force have escalated with civilians killed and other forces attempting to mobilize from Zawiyya and Watiya airbase to support their allies.

On 16 September, clashes broke out in Sabratha among units affiliated with the Anas Dabbashi Brigade and the 48 Brigade, leaving at least five dead and 18 injured. LNA air force jets flew over the city on 18 September, triggering local fears that the LNA might intervene if the clashes escalate further. A brief ceasefire was announced on 18 September for an ICRC led evacuation though it is reported that the gun fighting continued.

On 9 September GNA PM Serraj, HoR President Saleh and the head of the High Council of State Swehli attended African Union summit on Libya in Brazzaville, Congo. The Shahid Nouri Friwan Brigade stated its support for Basit Igtet’s presidential bid and warned “against [those] trying to silence people’s voices” during Igtet’s planned demonstrations in Tripoli later this month. Mohamed al-Senussi, stated that elections will not be possible and instead called for the restoration of Libya’s 1951 post-independence constitution.

On 30 August, Serraj appointed a Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army under the GNA, a move rejected by the LNA. On 1 September, a Zawiyya militia attacked a demonstration in commemoration of Gaddafi’s revolution, organised by local rivals affiliated with the LNA.

Haftar, Nayed and Igtit have indirectly launched their bids for candidacy in prospective presidential elections in 2018. In a video resignation, Mustafa Abu Shagour pointed to Ageelah Saleh and the HoR’s reluctance to move forward with amendments to the LPA as major reason for his departure.

Saiqa initially rejected the ICC arrest warrant issued for al-Warfalli on 15 August, but now reports that he is suspended pending investigation. A delegation from Derna led by the head of the Derna municipal council met with Serraj on 15 August to discuss the on going siege on the city. On 16 August, internal clashes broke out between Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Omar al-Mukhtar Operations Room over control at the Martuba checkpoint which controls entry into Derna.

The recent political rapprochement attempts between Fayez al-Serraj, Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar, may be in jeopardy as recent statements from the LNA hint that Haftar is still intent on gain control of the capital though military measures.

On 1-3 August, Egypt facilitated mediation talks between LNA and Misratan delegations in Cairo. A understanding between both delegations hinged on respect of Libya’s unity and sovereignty, efforts to avoid bloodshed, build a civilian state, discard all kinds of foreign intervention and fight terrorism and criminal groups, including militias.

On 29 July, a majority of Libya’s CDA voted to approve the latest draft of the Libyan constitution draft, even as local and armed protestors attempted to disrupt the vote and assaulted some CDA members. The Head of the CDA formally issued the constitution draft on 31 July, and with HoR approval the document should progress to a national referendum within the next 30 days.

On 25 July, LNA Commander Haftar and GNA PM Serraj have ‘committed to a ceasefire’ with promises to use force for counter-terrorism efforts only, and to work towards holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Spring of 2018. Misrata and other Islamist-affiliated members of the PC fear they might loose their role in Libyan power politics if the HCS is dissolved as an interim institution in exchange for new parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 14 July, Government of National Accord (GNA) President Fayez Serraj announced a new plan to realize the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which would include parliamentary AND Presidential elections by March 2018. Also on the docket is the establishment of a high national reconciliation council, large scale disarmament, demobilisation of militias, and major economic reforms. […]

On 9 July, major clashes broke out between pro and anti Government of National Accord (GNA) militias in Garaboulli, 30km east of Tripoli, after anti-GNA militias deployed forces with vehicles and heavy artillery to the area in a new bid to march on the capital and overthrow the GNA.

On 2 July, 16 senior political figures from Misrata attended a high profile meeting in Egypt at the invitation of the Egyptian Chief of Staff and the Foreign Minister. On 28 June, Libya’s eastern foreign minister visited Russia to discuss options for a new Libyan-Libyan dialogue

Last week, Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar met with the heads of various eastern Libyan tribes in the LNA headquarters of Rajmah in Benghazi. 

On 17 June, a convoy of anti-GNA militias from Misrata attempted to deploy to Tripoli. However, they reportedly became divided among themselves, cancelled the deployment and most of them drove back to Misrata. On 15 June, 46 HoR members formed a new bloc called the ‘National Consensus Bloc’.

A Zintani militia claims to have released Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi while the HoR releases a blacklist of Libyan individuals and entities it claims are linked to terrorist activities through Qatar.

On 26 May, pro-GNA Tripoli militias evicted rival anti-GNA militias from the capital, taking over key sites including Hadba prison. 52 people were killed in the fighting. The LNA recognised the pro-GNA militias’ efforts against ‘Islamist terrorists’.

Anti- GNA militias mobilized south of Tripoli and deployed forces to various locations in preparation for a new operation in the capital dubbed ‘Libya Honor’ while Serraj missed a scheduled meeting with Haftar in Cairo.

On 9 May, the GNA-aligned Nawasi brigade reportedly stormed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, calling for PM Fayez al-Serraj to dismiss Mohamed Taher Siala as the minister after he called Haftar the legitimate commander of the Libyan Army.