Libyan actors

On 21 May, the LNA announced a new aerial campaign. Before, Russia seems to have had transferred fighters and attack jets to Jufra airbase. Over the last week, the siege by GNA forces on the LNA’s last western stronghold of Tarhouna continued.

On 18 May, LNA forces stationed at Watiya left the airbase and GNA forces took over. The same day GNA-aligned Turkish drones targeted suspected LNA fuel trucks north of the LNA-controlled Jufra airbase. On 19 May, the LNA spokesperson, Mesmari, indicated that LNA forces would be withdrawing from the southern Tripoli frontlines as the month of Ramadan comes closer to the Eid al-Fitr celebration.

On 11 May, the LNA spokesperson, indicated that a deal had been brokered between Haftar, and the chairman of the HoR, Saleh. On 9 May, the LNA launched as many as 150 artillery shells on Tripoli. On 6 May, the LNA announced a new aerial operation against the GNA dubbed “Operation Ababil Birds”. Throughout the week GNA-aligned Turkish drones launched aerial attacks on the LNA controlled Watiya airbase.

On 29 April, the LNA spokesperson, al-Mismari, announced that the LNA had agreed to a humanitarian truce for Ramadan. The GNA responded that it does not trust any ‘truce’ agreement made by the LNA. On 5 May, GNA-aligned forces began a ground assault on the LNA-controlled Watiya airbase south of Zuwara. On 30 April, a video was released showing the head of the HoR, Saleh, meeting with his fellow Obeidat tribal members to discuss his recent political initiative.

On 27 April, LNA head Khalifa Haftar claimed that the LNA had a “popular mandate” to rule Libya. Over the last week, there was a significant social response in the eastern region expressing support for the LNA and military rule. On 26 April, GNA-aligned forces allegedly launched aerial attacks on Watiya airbase, with several number of deaths reported. Throughout the last week, GNA-aligned forces have targeted the town of Tarhouna, as well as supply routes into the town near Bani Walid, with multiple airstrikes.

On 18 April, the GNA Volcano of Rage Operation began an assault to capture the town of Tarhouna, which acts as the LNA’s forward base for its Tripoli operations. The same day, the GNA-aligned forces from the GNA’s Western Military Region made advances on the Tripoli International Airport axis. On 14 April, GNA-aligned forces and LNA forces engaged in intensive fighting at the Zareer checkpoint, located 13km north of Watiya airbase.

On 13 April, armed groups aligned to the GNA claimed to have captured pro-LNA towns, including Sabratha. The same day, reports emerged on social media claiming that the GNA has been attempting to bribe the city of Bani Walid. On 12 April, the LNA undertook an assault on the Abu Grein axis. In a counter-attack on the same locations, all territory was re-captured. On 6 April, an armed group stormed the MMRA station at al-Shuwayrif and shut off the pipeline, effectively cutting off the water supply to Tripoli, Bani Walid, Tarhouna and Misrata.

The first week of April has seen the highest number of aerial attacks since the LNA launched its assault on Tripoli in April 2019. Relatively senior anti-LNA field commanders have been killed. On 2 April, GNA Prime Minister al-Serraj issued an official statement calling for a reshuffle at the CBL. On 5 April, 18 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in Libya.

On 25 March, GNA-aligned forces launched multiple coordinated assaults on LNA forces at Watiya airbase, in Abu Grein and in the south of Tripoli, in what has been dubbed as “Operation Peace Storm.” On 29 March, Libya’s National Centre for Disease Control confirmed eight cases of COVID-19 in Libya. Both the GNA in Tripoli and the eastern-based parallel government have imposed additional measures.

Over the last week, Libyan authorities have taken preventative measures to tackle Covid-19 and as of the evening of 24 March, the National Centre for Disease Control confirmed the first case. On 22 March, the TPF published a video accusing the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Bashaagha of being the “hand” of the USA and France. On 20 March, GNA-aligned forces captured Sudanese mercenaries embedded amongst LAN forces in southern Tripoli.

Throughout the last week, there appears to have been a build-up of forces on the Abu Grein frontline, south of Misrata. On 8 March, the Misratan frontline field commander Arfidah was killed. On 10 March, a member of the Nawasi Brigade was killed, possibly a retribution for the killing of Arfidah. On 10 January, the GNA’s Western Military Region Commander, Juwaili, reportedly attempted to create a military camp in the Nafousa Mountains.

On 9 March, the Egyptian Military reportedly completed training a special navy commando unit to assist LNA forces. On 3 March, the eastern-based parallel government claimed to have officially re-opened the Libyan Embassy to Syria in Damascus. Throughout the week, LNA forces shelled Mitiga airport and the neighbouring areas.

The HoR and the HCS refused to attend the UNSMIL-mediated political dialogue talks which began in Geneva on 26 February. The LNA continues to undertake indirect fire attacks on Tripoli.

On 23 February, the second round of the UN-mediated 5 + 5 JMC discussions concluded in Geneva while the HoR and HCS both expressed reservations about the political track discussions due to start this week. On 22 February, the Zuwara municipality declared a state of emergency. The same day, heavy fighting broke out between anti-LNA forces and LNA forces 17km south of Ghariyan.

On 18 February, LNA forces shelled Tripoli port. On 18 February, the attack coincided with the UN-mediated 5 + 5 Joint Military Committee discussions resumed in Geneva. On 18 February, the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, meeting with the US ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, in Rajma.

On 3 February, LNA head Haftar issued a decree assigning Major General al-Hamali as the commander of the Zawiyya Military Zone. On 6 February, LNA-affiliated airstrikes targeted a group of militants at their hideout on the outskirts of Derna. On 8 February, the UN-mediated 5 + 5 Joint Military Committee meeting in Geneva concluded.

From 1-2 February, clashes and aerial attacks between Haftar’s LNA and anti-LNA forces occurred in the al-Washka area. On 3 February, the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission mediated by UNSMIL began with meetings. On the same day, the Libyan Embassy in Niger released a video statement denouncing the GNA and declaring its recognition of the HoR as Libya’s legitimate and sovereign government.

On 21 January, the GNA’s deputy ambassador to Tunis resigned. On 22 January, several projectiles were fired at Mitiga Airport, resulting in flights being cancelled at the airfield. On 24 January, Turkish President Erdogan stated that Turkey has sent military personnel, in the form of a training and cooperation team, to Libya. On 26 January, LNA forces clashed with anti-LNA forces from Misrata in a failed attempt to capture the town of Abu Grein. On 26 January, the LNA spokesperson al-Mismari confirmed the assault but stated the LNA does not believe the assault is a breach of the Russia-Turkey ceasefire.

On 17 January, Haftar met with key Greek political officials in Athens ahead of the Berlin conference. On 19 January, Haftar met with German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron in Berlin. Serraj, on the other hand, met with Merkel and Turkish President Erdogan individually. Serraj and Haftar agreed separately to nominate representatives for a ceasefire committee. On 20 January, US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, met with Serraj and Haftar following the Berlin conference.

On 11 January, Serraj welcomed a Turkish-Russian proposed ceasefire. The LNA also accepted the truce last-minute. Serraj and Haftar then both visited Moscow but only Serraj signed the ceasefire agreement. Haftar left Russia without signing the deal.

On 3 January, Haftar declared a state of full mobilisation to defend Libya from Turkey. On 4 January, the HoR held an emergency meeting and asked the international community to withdraw its recognition of the GNA. On 4 January, the LNA launched a drone strike targeting a military academy camp in Tripoli and killing 30 people. On 6 January, the LNA launched an assault on Sirte, resulting in the withdrawal of local anti-LNA forces and GNA-aligned Misratan forces.

On 19 December, the GNA approved its security MoU with Turkey. On 26 December, the GNA formally requested Turkish ground, naval and aerial support for its forces fighting against Haftar’s LNA in Tripoli and Erdogan said the Turkish parliament would vote on the issue in January. On 23 December, the Municipality of Misrata issued a statement refuting that it had had any communication with Haftar’s forces after Haftar issued an ultimatum on 19 December calling for Misrata to withdraw its forces from Tripoli.

On 12 December, the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, announced a new ‘Zero Hour’. GNA head Fayez al-Serraj urged his forces to stand against the LNA and called upon countries that back Haftar to leave the people of Libya alone. On 15 December, representatives of Misrata met and announced a general state of mobilisation for Misratan forces.

On 9 December, the NOC declared force majeure on crude loadings from Mellitah port. On 7 December, a LNA MiG23 fighter jet crashed in Zawiyya. On 4 December, an unidentified armed group undertook two raids on the GNA’s Ministry of Finance in Tripoli.

Over the last week, the LNA maintained its aerial dominance over Tripoli, while the GNA did not launch any aerial attacks. The LNA also launched air attacks on Tripoli’s western and southern periphery. On 27 November, a contingent of the loosely GNA aligned SPF and the local GNA-aligned PFG unit launched a coordinated attack on the al-Feel oilfield. On 28 November, the NOC confirmed that following the cessation of military activity at the al-Feel oil field, production had resumed.

The US State Department said that on 24 November, a delegation of senior US officials met with LNA leader Haftar. On 23 November, LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced a “No Fly Zone” (NFZ) over Tripoli. Over the last week, LNA or LNA affiliated-personnel met with decision makers and communities in west Libyan towns.

On 12 November, the LNA intensified its push into the southern Tripoli moving on Khalla, the Swehli crossroads and Naher fronts.

In an interview on 4 November, Khalifa Haftar, leader of the LNA, reiterated his conviction of the LNA’s eventual military success in Tripoli. On 5 November, the LNA launched aerial attacks targeting a military facility east of Ghardabiya airbase. On 10 November, the LNA claimed to have taken control of the Souq al-Khamis area further south of Tripoli.

On 3 November, the GNA’s Volcano of Rage Operation said that the LNA had conducted four airstrikes against Tripoli’s Mitiga airport. On 1 November, the LNA said it had launched airstrikes against a military camp near Zelten, west of Tripoli. On the same day, the GNA’s PC issued a statement condemning LNA airstrikes against the Ministry of Interior headquarters.

The LNA continued to push along frontlines in southern Tripoli last week and claimed to have launched airstrikes against anti-LNA positions south of Surman and against a Misratan convoy moving on Jufra. The anti-LNA forces claimed an ambush near the Yarmouk military camp, which reportedly killed 16 LNA fighters.

On 21 October, the GNA Ambassador to Italy, Omar Tarhouni, stated that the planned international conference on Libya to be held in Berlin will occur in April 2020. On 18 – 19 October, members of the Tubruq-based HoR convened in Cairo with their Egyptian counterparts to discuss possible exits from the ongoing Libyan political crisis.

On 14 October, suspected LNA aerial attacks struck a house in the al-Furnaj neighbourhood of Tripoli, killing three children and their mother, and injuring another child. On 13 October, a TRB commander accused the MoF and CBL of obstructing a deal for additional support from Turkey.

On 5 October, the LNA launched airstrikes on Misrata International Airport. Ahmed al-Mesmari said that the LNA had launched four raids targeting four military targets in Sirte. On 3 October, the spokesperson for the SPF confirmed that the LNA had launched airstrikes targeting al-Qardabiya base.

On 25 September, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, gave a speech at the UN General Assembly in New York claiming he would never sit at the negotiating table with Khalifa Haftar. A few hours after Serraj’s address, the LNA released a statement arguing it had “always called for peace.”

During the last week, the Libyan National Army (LNA) has increased its aerial attacks on anti-LNA forces in southern Tripoli, with a specific focus on reducing their aerial and drone assets. Heavy fighting has been reported within and in proximity to the Tripoli International Airport (TIA), Aziziyya, al-Asebea, and Khallat al-Furjan.

On 13 September, the commander of the LNA’s 9th Brigade Abdel Wahab al-Magari, the commander of the 7th Brigade/Kani militia Mohsen Kani and his brother Abdel Adeem Kani were killed in southern Tripoli. On 13 September, the GNA claimed its air forces successfully targeted the LNA’s operations room located at the Jufra airbase while the LNA has stated it repelled the attack. On 16 September, the LNA launched aerial strikes targeting the GNA-aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) in Sirte.

On 7 September, the anti-LNA coalition launched a coordinated assault against LNA forces in southern Tripoli.

On 26 and 30 August, the LNA launched an assault on the mountain town Ghariyan but were repelled. On 28 August, anti-LNA forces launched an assault on LNA forces along the Zatarna axis in south-eastern Tripoli. On 31 August, four projectiles struck Mitiga airport in Tripoli, damaging the runway and hitting a passenger jet operated by Libyan Airlines.

On 21 August, anti-LNA forces made an advance into al-Asabea. On 25 August, heavy clashes occurred between LNA and anti-LNA forces 45 km southeast of Ghariyan and Ghout al-Reeh. On 26 August, the LNA claimed control of three villages south of Ghariyan.

LNA airstrikes in western Libya have increased over the last week, targeting sites in Zuwara, Abu Kammash, Tripoli and Misrata. In Murzuq, clashes between Tebu and LNA-aligned groups escalated, leading to widespread displacement.

On 9 August, the GNA accepted the UN’s call for a temporary ceasefire for Eid. On 10 August, Haftar announced that his forces would also temporarily cease military operations. However, several violations of the truce occurred. On 10 August, the LNA deployed additional forces to Murzuq to engage with ‘Chadian opposition forces’.

The LNA conducted several airstrikes throughout last week. On 4 August, at least 42 people were killed and more than 60 injured after an LNA aerial attack hit a town hall meeting in Murzuq. On 5 August, the LNA hit Misrata Air College.

On 26 July, the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Volcano of Wrath operation published a statement claiming to have destroyed a hanger of drones and a cargo plane at the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Jufra airbase. Later the same day, the LNA claimed it had hit more than ten targets at the Misrata Air College, destroying an air defence system and UAV platforms.

On 22 July, a LNA L-39 Albatross fighter jet made an emergency landing on a road in Beni Khadash in eastern Tunisia. On 21 July, the LNA spokesperson, Ahmed al-Mismari, said the LNA had drawn up its final plan to capture Tripoli. The following day the LNA launched it “second wave” assault to capture the capital. On 18 July, the HCS published a statement accusing France, the UAE, and Egypt of assisting the LNA.

On 15 July, the WHO reported that since the clashes began in Tripoli at the start of April, over 1093 people have been killed, including 106 civilians. Notable clashes occurred in Wadi al-Rabea, Ain Zara, Salahuddin and Khallat Furjan. On 13-15 July, as many as 80 Libyan HoR members met in Cairo at the invitation of the Egyptian National Committee on Libya.

On 2 July, an airstrike killed at least 53 people and injured 130 more after striking a detention centre in the Tajoura suburb of Tripoli. On 6 July, the LNA announce a ‘second wave’ mobilisation to take Tripoli. On 7 July, the LNA conducted additional aerial attacks on Mitiga airport. On 7 July, GNA-affiliated forces tried to fully take Qasr Ben Ghashir and the area surrounding the Tripoli International Airport from LNA forces. On 8 July, the LNA elevated Major Mahmoud al-Werfalli to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

On 26 June, the GNA announced that forces aligned with it had taken control of the town of Gharyan. On 1 July, the LNA started a new campaign dubbed the “Consequence of Treachery”. On 30 June, the head of the eastern-based House of Representatives declared a “general mobilisation.”

On 18 June, the World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that since the clashes began in early April, 691 people have died, including 41 civilians. On 21 June, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, gave an interview laying out his post-conflict strategy.

On 13 June, the NOC released a statement expressing its concern over “an increased military presence” at its Ras Lanuf oil terminal. On 14 June, the RASCO chairman issued a statement denying the NOC’s claims. On 16 June, the GNA Prime Minister, Fayez al-Serraj, announced a new peace plan initiative, under the auspices of the UN.

On 9 June, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported 653 people have been killed so far as a result of the clashes in Tripoli. On 5 and 6 June, the LNA launched airstrikes targeting the military section of Tripoli’s Mitiga International Airport.

On 3 June, the WHO stated that 607 people have been killed in Tripoli since 4 April. On 3 June, Fayez al-Serraj claimed forces aligned to the GNA had made advances on all fronts against the LNA. On 2 June, the spokesman for the LNA claimed the LNA had “thwarted all counter-attack attempts carried out by the so-called GNA militias.” On 1 June, the GNA’s Western Military Region spokesperson stated that its forces were undertaking a new tactic. On 1 June, the head of the GNA’s Naval Forces dismissed the suggestion that the western maritime area was a military zone.

On 27 May, the WHO stated that 562 people have been killed since the LNA launched its assault on Tripoli on 4 April. On 27 May, the GNA-aligned Hatteen Brigade deployed from Misrata to Tripoli. On 25 May, the LNA’s Western Region Operations Room Commander, Major General Abdussalam al-Hassi, stated that LNA forces had made significant advances in southern Tripoli.

On 20 May, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Naval Forces, Major General Faraj al-Mahdawi, declared a state of emergency with a ban on shipments to all western maritime ports. On 18 May, Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned forces received a shipment of armed vehicles at Tripoli port.

The LNA’s “Operation Flood of Dignity” against GNA-aligned forces in southern Tripoli continued throughout the first week of Ramadan. On 9 May, the GNA stated that 40 foreign firms operating in Libya must renew their operating licences or face suspension of their operations in Libya.

On 5 May, the LNA released an audiotape in which its leader, Khalifa Haftar, advises his forces to push hard and to “teach the enemy a greater and bigger lesson than previous ones.” On 2 May, the GNA spokesman and the chairman of the Presidential Council’s Emergency Committee held a press conference.

Last week, armed clashes, shelling and airstrikes continued along the front lines in southern Tripoli between Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces and forces aligned to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, with both sides frequently losing and gaining territory in southern Tripoli. Indiscriminate shelling/rocket attacks on residential areas have also continued. According to the UN, as of 28 April, at least 41,000 people have been displaced in Tripoli, nearly 300 people killed and thousands injured. The levels of disinformation and propaganda remain extremely high on all sides.

On 22 April, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesman, Ahmed al-Mismari, claimed the LNA would intensify its assault on Tripoli. On 22 April, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj stated he wouldn’t negotiate with Khalifa Haftar until his forces have withdrawn from the capital.

On 11 April, the LNA military prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for a raft of high-profile Tripoli and Misratan political and security figures. In Tripoli, the situation on the ground appears to have reached a stalemate. Neither the LNA nor anti-LNA forces have lost or gained any significant ground since last week. In contrast, the number of aerial attacks had increased.

On 3 April, the Libyan National Army (LNA) announced the launch of its long-anticipated operation in western Libya. On 4 April, LNA leader Khalifa Haftar released a statement declaring Operation “Flood of Dignity” to liberate Tripoli.

On 29 March, Haftar states that within two weeks there will be a unified government in Libya. On 31 March, the LNA’s 155 Battalion, declared to the LNA Central Command its readiness for mobilising. On 30 March, elections for nine of the 69 municipals councils in southern and western Libya took place.

On 20 March, the Government of National Accord (GNA) officially endorsed the new 2019 budget.

On 17 March, the eastern-based Interim government’s launched a security operation to remove “terrorists and criminals” from Libya’s South. On 13 March, al-Bunyan al-Marsous spokesman stated that an attack on Sirte by the LNA would be a declaration of war. On 15 March, the LNA released three Zawiyyan prisoners from Qirnada Prison in eastern Libya. On 18 March, the PC has agreed on a budget of around 48.6 billion LYD for 2019.

On 10 March, the LNA took control over the Abu Hadi Checkpoint, south of Sirte. The GNA aligned Sirte Protection Force (SPF) announced a state of emergency in response and mobilised additional forces east and south of Sirte. On 7 March, the LNA’s 73 Brigade observed ‘hostile elements’ making their way through to the Murzuq area. On 9 March, Chadian Interior Minister held a meeting with the LNA and Tebu tribes to secure the common border. On 6 March, GNA spokesperson held a press conference to give further details about the so-called ‘Abu Dhabi Dialogue’,

On 3 March, the LNA claimed it had entered the town of Qatrun. On 28 February, the High Social Council of the Libyan Tuareg announced that the LNA had peacefully entered Ghat and al-Awenat. On 1 March, the LNA officially confirmed its control over Umm al-Aranib. On 4 March, the NOC officially lifted force majeure on Sharara oilfield.

On 20 February, the LNA claimed to have taken control of Murzuq after clashes with the South Protection Force. On 21 February, the Libyan National Army (LNA) announced that it had taken over the security of al-Feel oilfield without any fighting. On 23 February, the LNA’s Tariq bin Zayed Battalion was involved in clashes in the Umm al-Aranib area against Chadian militias.

On 13 February, the GNA claimed that it had coordinated an airstrike with joint U.S.-Libyan forces targeting al-Qaeda members near Awbari. The Libyan National Army (LNA) has begun the second phase of its ‘Operation Southern Liberation’ this week, advancing on Umm al-Aranib and launching airstrikes in the Murzuq area.

On 7 February, the LNA extended its reach towards the Sharara and al-Feel oilfields. On 9 February, the LNA air force carried out airstrikes near al-Feel airstrip. On 11 February, a deal was struck between the LNA and the unit that currently guards Sharara. On 8 February, the TPF announced that it would be integrating into a new, larger coalition and the 301 Brigade took positions in southern Tripoli.

The Libyan National Army (LNA) mobile force continued to advance southward into the Murzuq region last week. On 30 January, LNA spokesman stated that the LNA now has three axes of connection to Libya’s western region coinciding with several declarations of support for the LNA in the region. On 2 February, the GNA’s Chief of Staff stated that the GNA was not coordinating with the LNA in the south.

On 23 January, the LNA spokesman Ahmed al-Mismari labelled UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame as an ‘opponent.’ The military campaign launched by the LNA to exert its control over the southern region made notable progress. On 26 January, the head of the HSC Khalid al-Mishri resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood.

On 21 January, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the TPR and the 7th Brigade following clashes in southern Tripoli. Over the last week, the Libyan National Army (LNA) has continued to consolidate its presence in and around Sebha as a part of its campaign to secure the southern region.

On 15 January, LNA confirmed that an operation to liberate southern Libya from “terrorist” groups is underway. On 8 January, the LNA’s Military Police Brigade was deployed to Ras Lanuf and Brega to facilitate security in the Oil Crescent. On 8 January, three Presidential Council members instructed all government staff to cease supporting PC head Fayez al-Serraj.

On 3 January, the Attorney General issued warrants for 31 members of Chadian and Sudanese opposition groups and 6 Libyan nationals.

On 29 December, the Directors of security in Tripoli and Benghazi met in Benghazi to discuss unification. On 27 December, a Chadian rebel militia attacked the LNA’s 10th Brigade leaving one dead and 12 more wounded at Taraghin.

On 19 December, the LNA undertook a pre-emptive attack on Ibrahim Jadhran. On 22 December, the east-based Interim Government declared a state of high alert in Benghazi. On 18 December, four Tripoli militias announced their merger.

Over the last week, the LNA deployed a significant amount of forces to the Oil Crescent. On 12 December, the Security Information Unit Tripoli Branch announced it had begun enacting new joint security operations in Tripoli.

On 4 December, the LNA stated that they had removed “terrorist” elements from the area around Tazirbu. On 4 December, notable deployments of LNA forces to the Oil Crescent began that continued throughout the week.

On 29 November, the HoR handed over the Constitution Referendum Law to the HNEC.

On 26 November, the HoR passed the referendum constitutional amendment and approved the restructuring of the PC. On 22 November, the LIA said it will appoint auditors to undertake a wide-ranging examination of its assets.

On 14 November, it was announced that Hashem Abedi will be extradited to the UK. On 14 November, the 7th Brigade from Tarhuna clashed with Abu Salim Central Security forces in Tripoli. On 15 November, the Security Operations Room of Sabratha arrested the former head of the Sabratha Military Council.

On 7 November, the Governors of competing Central Banks of Libya reach a consensus on audit terms. On 8 November, the High Council of State (HSC) called for a review of the reforming of the executive authority.

On 31 October, the HoR and HSC handed over a final agreement on the restructuring of the PC to UNSMIL. On 30 October, the Libyan National Army stated that it was launching a final assault against the Derna Protection Force. On 4 October, the Anti-ISIS Operations Room clashed with the Anas Dabbashi Brigade in Sabratha.

On 29 October, the HoR and the HCS announced that they had come to an agreement to reorganize the Presidential Council. On 27 October, the Presidential Council issued a statement announcing the approval of the new security arrangements in the Greater Tripoli area.

On 17 October, Libyan military unification talks resumed in Cairo. The discussions, mediated by Egypt, ended with no formal declaration, resolutions or agreements. On 19 October, the LNA launched Operation “Hawd Murzuq” in an attempt to remove rebel armed groups from southern Libya.

On 13 October, the LNA launched airstrikes on a convoy of Chadian mercenaries in the southern Tmassah area. On 14 October, fighting occurred between a coalition composed of the Khalid Bin Walid brigade and the Waw brigade against and a Chadian militia east of Tmassah.

On 6 October, the GNA and its new UN-backed Security Arrangements Committee announced new security arrangements in Tripoli. On 7 October, the GNA announced a reshuffle of its cabinet and assigned several new ministers.

Following the conclusion of clashes in Tripoli on 25 September, the GNA is moving to redraw security arrangements in the capital through the UN facilitated Security Arrangements Committee of Greater Tripoli. In light of this the GNA Local Government Minister is hosting a meeting of municipal mayors on 2 October to discuss decentralisation and the devolution of security functions to municipalities.

On 25 September, a ceasefire was brokered between the Tripoli Protection Force and Tarhuna’s 7th Brigade that saw the latter withdraw to the areas of control agreed in the UN-brokered ceasefire of 9 September. This coincided with forces under the command of Salah Badi retreating withdrawing from the Airport road.

On 18 September, hostilities erupt between militia groups south of Tripoli despite UN ceasefire. On 17 September, the security of Tripoli’s Mitigia airport had been handed over to the Central Security Forces. On 16 September, the GNA form joint force under the leadership of the commander of the western military zone.

On 9 September, UNSMIL gathered together the key rival factions involved in the militia clashes in Tripoli that began on 26 August to sign an eight-point agreement that included a pledge to refrain from extorting sovereign institutions. This is the second meeting in over a fortnight, with the first initiating the current ceasefire.

Major conflict erupted between militias in Tripoli on 27 August that has expanded over the following days into what seems to be a semi-coordinated military campaign aimed at eradicating the power of Tripoli-based militias, by an alliance of forces primarily including Tarhuna, Misrata and Zintan.

On 26 August, the Kani militia (also known as the 7th ‘Liwa’) deployed from Tarhuna to south Tripoli. The move provoked Tripoli armed groups to deploy reinforcements to these fronts. On 27 August, clashes broke out between the militias south of Tripoli. A temporary ceasefire held on 28 August but the situation remains volatile.

On 15 August, the LNA mobilized its forces to the Oil Crescent and declared a state of emergency in the region following reports of Ibrahim Jadhran allied militias traversing to the Wadi Zamzam area.

On 14 August, the House of Representatives (HoR) held its fourth session to date to discuss and vote on the legislation for a constitutional referendum.

On 1 August, the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) killed a man thought to be from the al-Burga militia in the Tajoura area of Tripoli. On 2 August, forces under Ghneiwa al-Kikli captured a clothes and textile factory in the Al-Hadba al-Badry area of Tripoli. On 31 July and 1 August, a series of clashes occurred between the Surman CID and the al-Nasr militia.

On 26 July, the first unofficial joint patrol between the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) 128 brigade and the Sirte Protection Force (SPF) was conducted along the Sirte-Jufra road. This region has seen multiple reports of recent of ISIS activity.

On 18 July, Fathi al-Majbary announced from Benghazi that he would no longer be a member of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Presidential Council (PC), calling the GNA a ‘farce’ and arguing that no central government could be run from Tripoli due to the influence the militias there.

On 10 July, Khalifa Haftar ordered all LNA-affiliated Petroleum Facilities Guards to allow oil ports under their control to resume exports under the authority of the Tripoli-based NOC and its subsidiaries. On 11 July, the NOC lifted force majeure on all of the Oil Crescent ports and Tobruq’s Hariga port.

On 6 July, the GNA issued a decree instating the commander of the Zintan Special Operations Force, Emad Trabelsi, as the President of the General Security Directorate. On 7 July, clashes took between Abdelghani al-Kikli aka Ghneiwa forces from Abu Slim and a former militia leader under his command.

On 2 July, the internationally-recognised National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on crude exports from Zueitina and Hariga oil ports. The NOC’s latest move comes in response to the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) decision on 25 June to transfer control of the Oil Crescent oil ports to the parallel Benghazi-based NOC.

On 25 June, the LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari stated that Khalifa Haftar had ordered that the all ports ‘liberated’ from Ibrahim Jadhran forces on 21 June by the LNA were to be handed over to the Benghazi-based National Oil Corporation, under the auspices of the Bayda-based parallel (interim) government led by Abdullah al-Thinni.