International actors

On 5 February, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boukadoum, met the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Rajma. On 6 February, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Bashaagha, met with a German government delegation. On 9 – 10 February, the UN-mediated “Economic and Financial Track” Dialogue took place in Cairo. On 10 February, US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, met with Bashaagha discussing the dismantlement of militias.

On 29 January, Salamé briefed the UNSC. On 29 January, the Turkish government confirmed it had four frigates and a refuelling vessel in the central Mediterranean. The same day, Macron accused Turkey of violating the Berlin conference. On 30 January, Algerian Prime Minister Djerad proposed that his country host a Libya “reconciliation forum” on behalf of the AU. On 2 February, Algeria’s President, Tebboune, proposed a meeting for Libya’s multiple “tribes” to be held in a regional country in order to create a solution to the current Libya crisis.

On 23 January, Algerian Foreign Minister Boukadoum held a meeting with foreign ministers from Mali, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia, the latter five nations sharing a common border with Libya. On 23 January, Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis stated the EU would not agree to a political solution to the Libya crisis while the GNA and Turkey maintain their maritime MoU. On 26 January, Turkish President Erdogan, met with Algerian Prime Minister, Tebboune, in Algeria. On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Maas met EU High Representative Borrell to discuss the situation in Libya. On 27 January, UNSMIL issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya”.

On 19 January, Germany held an international conference on Libya in Berlin including multiple state leaders and high-level delegates. The conference concluded with unanimous agreement on a final 55-point communiqué. The communiqué called for the UNSC to create an international committee to monitor the ceasefire and to impose sanctions on violations of the ceasefire.

On 8 January, Turkey and Russia jointly called for a ceasefire in Libya from 12 January. UN Envoy to Libya, Salame, welcomed the ceasefire and called upon the international community to make the most of the momentum to help reach a consensus through the “Berlin process”. On 8 January, Serraj refused to see Italian Prime Minister Conte after learning that Haftar had also been invited and received by the Italian leader. On 9 January, a delegation of senior US officials, met in Rome with Bashaagha and Haftar. On 11 January, Russian President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel met in Moscow to discuss Libya. On 14 January, Merkel’s office announced that she had agreed with the UN to go ahead with holding the Berlin conference on 19 January.

On 1 January, the Arab League convened an exceptional meeting in Cairo but failed to reach a consensus on how to de-escalate the conflict in Libya. On 2 January, Turkey’s parliament approved a bill to enable troops to be deployed to Libya to support the GNA. On 2 January, Egyptian President al-Sisi condemned in the “strongest terms” the Turkish parliament’s authorization. On 6 January, the GNA announced that a planned visit to Tripoli on 7 January by the newly appointed diplomat-in-chief of the EU Joseph Borrell and the foreign ministers of the UK, France, Germany and Italy had been postponed. On 6 January, Serraj arrived in Algeria to meet with the newly-elected Algerian President Tebboune.

On 17 December, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Libya and met with Serraj and Haftar. On 21 December, a senior US State Department official said that the US is “very concerned” about the intensification of the conflict in Libya. On 23 December, the EU issued a statement reiterating its calls on all Libyan parties to cease all military actions and resume the political dialogue. On 24 December, a high-profile meeting gathered together representatives from the Russian and Turkish foreign ministries. On 25 December, Turkish President Erdogan paid a surprise visit to Tunisia and met with Tunisian President Saied. On 28 December, Italian Prime Minister Conte warned that Russia and Turkey, and not Europe, are setting the agenda in Libya’s conflict. On 29 December, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said that Greece wants to be included in the UN-sponsored Berlin conference on the Libya conflict. On 29 December UN Envoy to Libya, Salamé, called for greater civilian protection following several incidents in western Libya.

On 12 December, the European Council condemned the maritime deal between the GNA and Turkey. On 14 December, the Security and Military MoU was introduced to the Turkish parliament. On 15 December, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with high-level representatives of Qatar as well as US Republican senator Lindsay Graham. On 16 December, Turkey claimed that Russian President Putin suggested working jointly in Libya.

On 7 December, US Army General, Stephen Townsend stated that he believed Russian air defence systems were responsible for shooting down an American unarmed drone over Tripoli in November. On 5 December, the text of the maritime agreement between the GNA and Turkey was published. On 6 December, the Greek Foreign Ministry stated it had given the GNA’s Ambassador to Greece 72 hours to leave the country.

On 27 November, the GNA signed an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey, along with an MoU to expand security and military cooperation. On 2 December, Speaker of the Tubruq-based HoR demanded to have the MoU retracted. On 2 December, the UNSC issued a statement expressing their “deep concern at the recent escalation of violence in Libya”.

On 21 November, members of the US Senate introduced a piece of legislation called ‘the Libya Stabilization Act’. Former Libyan ambassador to the UAE, Aref al-Nayed, met with US NSC officials twice ‘this fall’. On 21 November, an AFRICOM unarmed remotely piloted aircraft was lost over Tripoli. On 20 November, an Italian Air Force MQ-9A Predator B crashed near the city of Tarhouna.

On 14 November, the US State Department released a statement directly addressing the LNA and calling on it to “end its offensive on Tripoli.” On 13 November, representatives of the US State Department started a US-Libya Security Dialogue in Washington, DC with the GNA.

In an interview on 4 November, Haftar said that Qatari and Turkish support to the GNA will probably delay his troops’ advances and framed foreign support for the LNA as counterterrorism cooperation. He wished the Berlin conference success if it ever took place.

On 3 November, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, met in London. On 2 November, Italy’s deal with the GNA on migration was automatically renewed without amendments. The GNA and UN formally reopened Mitiga airport on 29 October and said that they planned to resume flights in the next two weeks.

On 26 October, US Embassy officials travelled to Benina to meet with notable eastern figures and discuss efforts to end the fighting around Tripoli and seek justice for US victims of the 11 September 2012 attack in Benghazi. On 27 October, the German foreign minister and UN Envoy discussed the Berlin conference in Tripoli. Russia hosted its first Africa summit which was attended by Serraj and eastern government representatives.

On 16 October, NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah met with key US officials in Washington to discuss the potential increase of oil outputs, investment opportunities and transparency in the Libyan oil sector. On 16 October, the chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs panel on the Middle East introduced a proposal “to clarify and strengthen American policy in support of a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the Libyan conflict.”

The planned “Berlin Conference” on Libya will be delayed until at least November. On 11 October, the UN Envoy to Libya said he remained hopeful that the Berlin Conference would lead to a UN Security Council resolution preventing foreign countries from escalating the crisis in Libya, as well as the implementation of mechanisms to enforce the arms embargo.

On 6 October, UNSMIL published a statement condemning airstrikes on the Equestrian Club in Tripoli’s Janzour neighbourhood. On 4 October, UNSMIL issued a statement expressing alarm at “indications that parallel, unrecognized authorities in Libya” are threatening the NOC and its subsidiary Brega.

On 26 September, France and Italy co-chaired a ministerial meeting on Libya on the sidelines of the UNGA. The meeting was attended by representatives from the US, the UK, the UAE, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, China, the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the African Union.

On 18 September, Conte and Macron met in Rome to discuss cooperation on Libya. On 19 September, US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland met with the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Dubai. On 23 September, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said France will chair a meeting on Libya on 26 September on the side lines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

On 11 September, Germany’s ambassador to Libya announced that Germany would host a conference on Libya in conjunction with the UN as a follow on to this year’s General Assembly discussions. On 15 September, the UK appointed Nicholas Hopton as its new chargé d’affaires.

On 8 September, the French newspaper Liberation published an interview with UN Special Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, who stated his belief that a political agreement between the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar and the Government of National Accord was “conceivable”.

On 26 August, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with the new Commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen Townsend, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland. On 30 August, Norland met with the head of the High Council of State (HCS), Khalid al-Mishri. On 29 August, the UN published a report outlining the UNSG overview of the Libyan crisis as presented to the UN Security Council.

On 23 August, France, UK, US, Italy, Egypt and the UAE met as a part of the P3+3 countries in Paris to “study and evaluate the security and financial conditions in Libya.” On 26 August, the G7 summit in France released a statement calling for an international conference on Libya.

The new US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, assumed his duties on 14 August. The UN investigated and condemned a LNA airstrike on Zuwara airport on 15 August.

On 8 August, the UN Envoy briefed the UNSC on the state of the planned UN-brokered ceasefire for Eid al-Adha. On 10 August, Turkey issued a statement in support of the ceasefire. On 12 August, France, Italy, the UAE, the UK and the US issued a joint statement in support of the UN’s efforts.

On 1 August, Haftar met with Sisi in Cairo to discuss security cooperation, On 4 August, Macron and Sisi had a phone call in which they discussed Libya. On 5 August, the UNSC said members “welcomed and expressed full support” for a proposed truce for Eid.

On 29 July, in a lengthy address to the UNSC, the UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame proposed a three-part immediate action to end the current conflict. On 28 July, Salame met with the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, at his headquarters in Rajma, in eastern Libya.

On 22 July, UNSMIL announced the reopening of bids for the selection of an international audit firm to audit the financial accounts of the competing Central Bank of Libya CBL branches.

On 16 July, the Governments of Egypt, France, Italy, UAE, UK, and the US issued a statement calling for an immediate de-escalation and halt to the current fighting. On 11 July, the UN Deputy Envoy to Libya, met with the senior leadership of the eastern-based CBL. On 8 July, the Javelin anti-tank missiles discovered amidst LNA forces in Ghariyan were confirmed to belong to France.

On 7 July, the UN’s Deputy Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, met with members of the eastern-based HoR as part of a 3-day tour of eastern Libya. On 5 July, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj visited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul. On 5 July, UNSC issued a statement condemning the attack on 2 July on a migrant detention centre in Tajoura. On 3 July, details emerged of the GNA Attorney General arresting two Russian men accused of attempting to influence future Libyan elections.

On 28 June, the LNA banned all commercial flights from Libya to Turkey. On 29 June, the Turkish Foreign Ministry demanded the release of six Turkish citizens by the LNA “otherwise the elements of Haftar will become a legitimate target.” On 29 June, the US State and Defence Departments opened an investigation to look into how American-made weapons had found their way to Libya.

On 20 June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirms Turkey is providing GNA with military equipment. On 22 June, UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi.

On 12 June, foreign ministers from Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia held a meeting where they called for all belligerents involved in the fighting in Tripoli to stop and return to a political solution. On 13 June, Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi met eastern-based parallel House of Representative Speaker Aguila Saleh in Egypt.

On 7 June, a bipartisan group of eight members of the US House of Representatives sent an open letter to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asking the White House to clarify its Libya position. On 10 June, the UNSC unanimously extended authorisation for vessels suspected of carrying arms to Libya to be intercepted.

On 31 May, the Tripoli-based US embassy Charge d’Affaires issued a statement, saying the US is “deeply concerned” about the shelling of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) clinic in Tripoli. On 3 June, NOC chairman, Mustafa Sanallah met with various senior European Union (EU) diplomats in Tripoli.

On 22 May, the head of the LNA Khalifa Haftar met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris. On 23 May, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with Algerian interim President, Abdelkader Bensalah, in Algiers. On 22 May, Serraj held a meeting with Tunisian President, Beji Caid Essebsi, to discuss the current crisis in Libya.

On 21 May, the UN Envoy to Libya gave a stark address to the UN Security Council. He warned that Libya is on the verge of descending into a civil war “which could lead to the permanent division of the country”. He added that the damage already done will take years to mend, and that’s only if the war is ended now.

On 10 May, the Prime Minister of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, concluded a visit to the heads of state in Germany, France, Italy and the UK. On 10 May, the UNSC held an emergency session focusing on the instability in Libya and the need for humanitarian action. On 13 May, the European Union Council released a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire. On 13 May, the UN Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, met with the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

On 5 May, UNSMIL called for a week-long humanitarian truce to start on 6 May at 4:00am (local time), coinciding with the beginning of Ramadan.

On 24 April, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in Rome. Salame called for Italy and all UN member states to push for a ceasefire and the return to dialogue, stressing that dialogue “is the only possible way to avoid the catastrophe.” He added that the National Conference, although impossible at present, remains essential in the long run. On 29 April, during a visit to Paris, Salame openly criticised Haftar. He is quoted as saying: “He is no Abraham Lincoln, he is no big democrat … Seeing him act, we can be worried about his methods because where he is governing, he doesn’t govern softly, but with an iron fist.”

On 15 April, US President Donald Trump had a phone conversation with Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar. On 22 April, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj played down the conversation between Haftar and Trump, saying that while he hadn’t spoken to Trump his engagement with the US administration suggested they opposed his military actions.

On 10 April, UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salamé stated he was postponing the National Conference due to take place on 14-16 April. On 13 April, Salamé release a statement indicating the UN had not given up the prospect of a political solution to end the clashes. On 15 April, Salame told the BCC that “I’m just as worried by the crack in the UN Security Council as the fighting on the ground.”

On 3 April, airstrikes occurred in the Uweinat area close to the Libya-Egypt border, targeting alleged terrorists. No country has claimed responsibility for the airstrikes.

On 30 March, the so-called Libya Quartet met on the side-lines of the 30th Arab League Summit. On 27 March, Libyan National Army (LNA) head Khalifa Haftar visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On 27 March, the Chadian government announced it has established a security force in its Tibesti Province to patrol its Libyan border.

On 22 March, the US State Department warned of an imminent attack on a vital national institution in Tripoli on 23 March. On 25 March, the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) reviewed its flight ban over Libyan airspace and is set to allow US carriers to fly over the country above 30,000 feet. On 20 March, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame announced the details of the long-delayed National Conference.

On 20 March, the UN envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, announced that the UN National Conference will take place in Ghadames on 14-16 April. On 13 March, several ambassadors met with GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and members of the HCS. On 18 March, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Tripoli. On 19 March, US ambassador to Libya Peter Bodde and US AFRICOM commander Thomas Waldhauser flew into Tripoli to meet with Serraj. On 16 March, Deputy UN Envoy Stephanie Williams made a visit to the electoral district of Aziziyya, south-west of Tripoli.

On 7 March, US company Culmen International was awarded a contract to provide security to Mitiga, Tripoli International and Misrata airports. On 8 March, the German-Libya Economic Forum took place in Tunis. On 10 March, the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Serraj, met with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani.

On 27 February, Khalifa Haftar and Fayez al-Serraj met in Abu Dhabi under the auspice of the UN envoy to Libya where both parties agreed to end the transitional phase of government. The dialogue was openly supported by the international community and received a mixed response in Libya.

On 22 February, ministers from Libya, Niger, Sudan and Chad signed the executive regulations of a new Joint Operations Centre for securing Libya’s common border with Niger, Chad and Sudan. On 24 February, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, travelled to Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt for joint European Union- African Union summit.

On 14 February, the US State Department released a statement outlining its concern over events in southern Libya. On 16 February, it was reported that the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashaagha, had met with FBI senior officials in Washington. On 18 February, UN envoy Ghassan Salame arrived in Benghazi to meet with LNA commander Khalifa Haftar.

On 9 February, US AFRICOM accused Russia of attempting to increase its presence in Libya. On 9 February, the UN Envoy to Libya held several side meetings on Libya at the African Union Summit in Ethiopia. On 11 February, House of Representative members met with the UK Ambassador to Libya in Tobruk.

On 3 February, French fighter jets had launched airstrikes on armed groups that entered northern Chad from Libya. On 2 February, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame announced the start of a tour of meetings with key Libyan political figures. On 2 February, European Union representative, Federica Mogherini, stated that there was consensus on Operation Sophia. On 30 January, the GNA’s Minister of Interior met with US Charge d’Affaires to Libya.

On 26 January, France announced it is planning to reopen its embassy in Libya this year. On 25 January, Russia’s Foreign Minister suggested that election deadlines for Libya were not constructive. On 24 January, Libya, Niger, Chad and Sudan agreed to have a ministerial meeting on border control. On 22 January, the GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj met with the US Ambassador to Libya.

On 22 January, Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini said that France has no interest in stabilising the situation in Libya, ‘probably because it has oil interests that are opposed to those of Italy.’ On 18 January, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Germany’s policy approach to Libya follows a similar style as the Italian government.

On 13 January, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame travelled to southern Libya for meetings with local officials and dignitaries. On 13 January, the head of the GNA Fayez al-Serraj pulled Libya from the Arab Economic Summit.

On 6 January, Fayez al-Serraj met with Russian Ambassador to Libya, Ivan Molotkov. On 5 January, Germany declared it will use its membership on the UN Security Council to support UNSMIL efforts. On 2 January, the GNA’s Interior Minister met with the British Charge d’Affairs.

On 27 December, Russian Envoy Mikhail Bogdanov said Saif al-Islam Qaddafi has the right to run for president in the elections next year.

On 23 December, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte visited the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in al-Rajma and the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, in Tripoli.

On 14 December, Italian diplomat Giuseppe Buccino Grimaldi was appointed as Italy’s new ambassador to Libya. On 14 December, US Colonel Adam Chalkley said conditions in Libya were improving for the return of a US diplomatic mission. On 18 December, the EU expanded its EUBAM to actively support Libyan authorities.

On 5 December, the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, arrived in Rome for an unannounced two-day visit. On 4 December, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister, Fayez al-Serraj, traveled to Brussels to attend a meeting with NATO officials.

On 29 November, AFRICOM conducted an airstrike killing eleven AQIM members and destroying three vehicles near al-Uwaynat in southern Libya.

On 24 November, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, indicated to Italian media that Russia does not have plans to establish a military base in Libya.

On 16 November, the UN Security Council listed Salah Badi for sanctions. On 15 November, the US State Department renewed its ten-year US-Libya Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. On 16 November, the LIA stated five EU countries paid out funds frozen by UN sanctions in 2011.

On 12-13 November, Italy’s international conference on Libya in Palermo occurred. On 8 November, UNSMIL envoy Ghassan Salame officially confirmed that Libyan elections announced for the end of 2018 will not take place.

On 30 October, the U.S. Africa Command released a statement denying reports that Commander General Waldhauser had made a recent visit to Sirte.

On 29 October, Belgium radio station RTBF claimed that prosecutors are investigating whether Belgium banks had paid out dividends to Libyan bank accounts frozen under the 2011 UN Sanctions. On 17 and 22 October, Russian aircraft landed at the LNA’s al-Khadim airport.

On 16 October, Italy’s Prime Minister declared that his country was ready to facilitate the Libyan reconciliation process at the “Sicily” International conference in November. On 18 October, the President of the European Parliament urged EU member states to take a unified stance on Libya at the conference.

On 10 October, Italy invited the head of Libya’s House of Representatives to its “Sicily” international conference on Libya in November. Two days earlier Russia’s Foreign Minister confirmed that a Russian representative would attend.

On 2 October, Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi stated that Italy would hold an international conference on Libya in the Sicilian capital of Palermo on 12 and 13 November.

On 26 September, an unidentified foreign aircraft launched an airstrike overnight in the vicinity of Hay al-Baladya, near Ubari. It is unclear who the specific targets were. No group has claimed responsibility. On 28 September, the US and the UK signed an agreement with DCA Mine Action to continue supporting demining projects near Sirte.

On 24 September, France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian called for stronger UN sanctions on Libyans attempting to block a political solution to the current crisis.

On 11 September, the UN Security Council Committee sanctioned rebel militant Ibrahim Jadhran. The following day, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control also sanctioned Jadhran for his attacks on the Oil Crescent.

On 10 September, Italian Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi held a meeting with Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar in al-Rajma, Benghazi.

On 28 August, US AFRICOM said it had killed a suspected ISIS fighter in an airstrike in Bani Walid. UNSMIL held a meeting on 4 September with all involved parties in Tripoli to try and reach a ceasefire agreement.

On 28 August, US AFRICOM said it had killed a suspected ISIS fighter in an airstrike in Bani Walid in coordination with the GNA. It didn’t name the person who was killed, but local residents named him as Walid Bu Hariba, a Libyan from Sirte.

On 19 August, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a statement condemning militia groups acting under the Ministry of Interior of the Government of National Accord (GNA) for attacking sovereign institutions.

On 9 August, the House of Representatives (HoR) Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation declared Italian Ambassador Giuseppe Perrone as a ‘persona non-grata’. The decree is in response to his comments last week that were widely interpreted as dismissing Libyan elections.

On 2 August, South Korean redirected the naval ship “Munmu the Great” from anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to Libya in order to protect South Korean commercial vessels. This action is thought to be a “show of force” in response to the kidnapping of a Korean technician.

On 30 July, Italy’s Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, told reporters following a White House meeting with US President Donald Trump that he would be organizing an international conference to look for ways to stabilise Libya.

On 18 July, Italian embassy and security officials accompanied the head of the maritime sector branch within the Government of National Accord’s Ministry of Interior for an official visit to Tripoli port and discussed plans to establish a joint Libyan-Italian maritime operations centre in Tripoli port.

On 14 July, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s foreign policy head, visited Tripoli to reestablish the EU’s diplomatic presence in Libya. In a statement, Mogherini restated the EU’s support for the UN initiative for elections and discussed ways to secure Libya’s land borders and train its coast guard.

On 7 July, Italy reactivated a Qadhafi era “friendship treaty” with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) that will see the European country give Libya $5 billion to prevent migrants from traveling over the Mediterranean.

On 24 June, Egypt’s Prosecutor-General, Nail Sadek, called for a ‘red notice’ to be issued by Interpol for the arrest of three Libyan ISIS members. On 27 June, Libyan national Ahmed Abu Khatallah was sentenced to 22 years in a US federal prison for his role in the 11 September 2012 terrorist attack on the US Special Mission in Benghazi.

On 20 June, U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) released a statement refuting local claims of civilian casualties from drone strikes it conducted near Bani Walid on 5 June that killed four ISIS members.

On 13 June, U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM), in cooperation with the Government of National Accord (GNA), conducted a drone strike killing an alleged member of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb approximately 50 miles southeast of Bani Walid.

On 5 June, U.S AFRICOM conducted a drone strike near Eshmikh, 35 km south of Bani Walid, killing four alleged ISIS members. On 6 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) gathered to discuss the results of the 29 May Paris summit on Libya. On 7 June, the UNSC Libya Sanctions Committee added 6 individuals to their sanctions list.

On 31 May, an agreement to secure and control Libya’s southern border was signed by Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Chad in the latter’s capital of N’Djamena. The details of how the agreement will be enacted and how this burden will be shared remains unclear.

On 29 May, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted a Libya summit where Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, President of the House of Representatives (HoR) Agilah Saleh, President of the High Council of State (HCS) Khaled Mishri, and General Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar agreed to hold ‘credible, peaceful’ parliamentary and presidential elections on 10 December 2018, and to respect the results of the election.

On 10 May, the Egyptian army announced it had foiled an “infiltration attempt” across its western border with Libya after reportedly destroying 4 vehicles. This week the UK issued a formal apology for extraditing Abdul Hakim Belhadj, a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and a key Feb17 military commander, to Qadhafi before the 2011 revolution.

On 4 May, Russia’s MoD, Sergey Shoigu, held a video-conference talk with LNA head Khalifa Haftar. The day before, on 3 May, GNA Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Siala, held talks with Russian Minister Foreign Affairs Deputy Mikhail Bogdanov and Russia’s Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev in Moscow.

On 30 April, the Libya Quartet said it supports Libya holding presidential and parliamentary elections this year. On 29 April, Egypt and France agreed that elections should be held in Libya before the end of 2018. On 27 April, the US and Libya’s GNA signed a Memorandum of Intent for airport security and a Letter of Agreement to support Libyan policing, prisons and justice sector development.

US House Foreign Affairs Committee hold a Subcommittee hearing on the status of Libya while Senegal decided to deport two former Guantánamo prison detainees to Libya.

On 14 April, attempts to negotiate peace between the Awlad Suliman, Tebu and Tuareg tribes, who have been clashing in and around the southern Libya city of Sebha since February of this year, have moved to Niger and are allegedly being facilitated by French diplomats after multiple attempts to reach a solution to the fighting have failed.

On 10 April, the UN released a report exploring armed groups control of prisons in Libya, the subsequent torturing of detainees and how successive government in Tripoli have been inability to curtail these activities. On 5 April, UNSMIL launched its first round of ‘consultative meetings’ in Benghazi and Zuwara, as part of the UN-initiated Libya National Forum followed by meetings in Ghariyan and Brak al-Shatti on 7 April and in Abu Salim on 10 April.

On 28 March, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed that on 24 March it had coordinated with the Libyan Government of National Accord to conduct drone strikes targeting a house near Ubari, killing two militants that belonged to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It disclosed that the strikes had killed Musa Abu Dawud, a high-ranking AQIM official.

On 24 March, the US military undertook drone strikes targeting a house near Ubari, allegedly killing two militants that belonged to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. On 22 March, the UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame briefed to the UNSC and conceded that an amendment to the Libyan Political Agreement leading to a final unified government before elections was unlikely.

On 20 March, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was reportedly remanded in custody for questioning in relation to an ongoing investigation concerning the provision of financial assistance to his 2007 election campaign by Muammar al-Qadhafi.

On 8 March, a spokesman for the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), Major Karl J. Wiest, stated that an additional four airstrikes had been carried out against IS fighters in Libya over the last 14 months. On 11 March, the Egyptian army announced it had foiled another attempt to “infiltrate” its western border with Libya after reportedly destroying 5 vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition on the Libyan border.

On 4 March, the Egyptian army announced it had foiled an “infiltration attempt” across its western border with Libya after reportedly destroying 11 vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition on the Libyan border.