Libyan actors

On 7 February, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, a LNA commander wanted on charges of war crimes by the ICC, handed himself into the LNA for questioning. On 11 February, the LNA affiliated AIOR apprehended a group allegedly plotting to conduct car bombs attacks in Sabratha. On 6 February, the LNA said it had arrested an extremist cell allegedly preparing VBIEDs in the Oil Crescent.

On 1 February, members of the mostly Misratan-staffed Central Region Zone intercepted a convoy of Tawerghan IDPs travelling from Ajdabiya near Bin Jawwad and prevented them from travelling any further west towards their hometown. The incident has received local and international condemnation given an ‘agreement’ was signed ensuring the IDPs could return to their hometown from 1 February.

On 24 January, Mahmoud al-Werfalli publicly executed 10 people imprisoned by the LNA in Benghazi following a double bomb attack in the city. On 26 January, 5 more bodies of accused jihadists were found in Lithi. On 24 January, GNA forces arrested 6 people accused of trafficking and torturing Sudanese migrants south of Sirte.

On 21 January, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed Mismari said that the LNA has carried out airstrikes on Sudanese and Chadian opposition fighters in the south east of Libya, near to Rabiana, as part of Operation Desert Fury. A convoy of 15 vehicles was reportedly hit, with some reports indicating Egyptian support was involved.

On 15 January, major clashes in Tripoli occurred between anti-Libyan National Army (LNA) and pro-Government of National Accord (GNA) militias at Mitiga airport. The attack was reportedly part of a ‘prison break’ assault by the anti-LNA militias from Tajoura (east Tripoli). As many as 20 people were killed and more than 60 injured as a result of the fighting.

GNA aligned forces triggered clashes with local militias near Zuwara’s Abu Kammash area on 5-6 January. The clashes ended on 8 January after an agreement was made over security arrangements for control of the land border and Zuwara port. On 6 January, the GNA affiliated ‘Kani brigade’ took control of the Garabulli coastal checkpoint before withdrawing.

On 27 December, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Ahmed Mismari reaffirmed the LNA’s commitment to elections provided HNEC is restructured. The following day Haftar insisted that if elections don’t come to pass there is no way ‘but authorisation’ of the LNA to take power.

On 19 December, the House of Representatives voted for a new Central Bank of Libya (CBL) governor, replacing incumbent Al-Seddiq Al-Kabir with former Deputy Governor Mohammed Al-Shukri. The UN Special Mission in Libya has rejected the appointment saying that it violates article 15 of the Libyan Political Agreement and must be done within its accord. […]

The 17 December ‘expiry’ date of the LPA was marked by an official television announcement from Khalifa Haftar declaring the LPA and its institutions expired. Haftar also endorsed ‘elections’ as the only legitimate expression of the Libyan people’s will. The same day, Misrata’s municipal mayor Mohammed Eshtewi was abducted and killed shortly after landing in the city on a flight from Turkey.

On 6 December, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame co-chaired the official launch of the voter registration process for elections in 2018. On 8 December, almost all of Libya’s mayors and municipal councils met in Tunis. The newly formed ’17 December’ movement called for civil disobedience in Tripoli and for LNA control of the city.

On 3 December, UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo where he said they discussed the importance of elections for Libya’s future. The two men also discussed efforts to combat terrorism, the current economic crisis, and the recent Cairo meetings between Libyan National Army (LNA) officials and their counterparts from […]

On 20 November, the HoR voted to approve the proposed amendments to the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). On 23 November, the HCS President Swehli issued a statement rejecting the HoR vote. On 27 November, UN Envoy Salame began a whirlwind tour of Libya visiting Tripoli, Misrata and he plans to visit Benghazi on 29 November.

The UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame made a case to the UN Security Council on 15 November that the Libyan political process was on track. However, President of the HCS Abdurrahman al-Swehli criticised Salame for ‘ignoring’ consensus and ‘partnership’. On 19 November, a delegation of 29 HoR members was not allowed to land in Tubruq airport. The delegation was reportedly intending to vote on the new LPA amendment.

On 10 November, the GNA military campaign against LNA-affiliated 4th Brigade in Wershefana concluded ‘successfully’. On 11 November, 28 bodies were discovered with bullet wounds and torture marks in Wershefana. On 10 November, Faraj Gaem, GNA deputy MoI in Benghazi, accused the LNA of trying to assassinate him, leading the LNA to arrest him and ban all GNA officials from eastern Libya.

On 1 November, a new GNA-supported military campaign was launched in Wershefana against LNA-affiliated forces. It is led by Usama al-Juwaili and includes units from Zintan, Tarhouna, and Tripoli. Talks in Egypt last week to unify the Libyan armed forces have stalled following the ‘mystery’ Derna airstrikes.

On 30 October, airstrikes of unknown origin hit the Dahr al-Hamar and al-Fatieh districts of Derna. The strikes killed at least 12 children and women, and injured many more. Both the LNA and the Egyptian military have denied responsibility for the incident. The LNA said it had set an internal six-month deadline to conclude the ongoing UN dialogue talks or else the LNA would move on Tripoli. Clashes broke out in the center of Zawiyya and near the oil refinery on the evening of 30 October.

Since taking control over Sabratha in early October, Khalifa Haftar has strengthened his relationship with several important military leaders in the west of Libya. This week Misratan General Salem Juha, endorsed Haftar as leader of the national army. It is reported that Haftar met with the GNA’s Commander of the Western Region during his trip to the UAE earlier last week. On October 20, a large militia in Sabratha, the Sareyyat al-Orouba, turned itself over to the LNA-affiliated AIOR. On 17 October, intense clashes erupted at Tripoli port after the GNA’s Presidential Guard and the Nawasi Brigade tried to take the port by force. The Presidential Guard secured the facility on 22 October, and it is now operational. On October 19, the Megarha tribe cut off water supplies to Tripoli, in an effort to secure the release of Mabrouk al-Hniesh from Rada Special Deterrence Force.

On 6 October a militia affiliated with theLNA, expelled the Anas Dabbashi militia from Sabratha and Mellitah Oil and Gas Complex, with the approval of the GNA. Local communities who support the LNA victory are demonstrating against the Sabratha Municipal Council, and are demanding that the mayor to resign. On 14 October, Haftar gave a speech at a gathering of security officials in Benghazi, and said that it was unlikely that the UN led political path was the only way forward, instead implying that a military solution “approved by the people” remains possible.

On 6 October, the Anti-ISIS Operations Room, a force friendly with both GNA and LNA authorities, announced its control of Sabratha after defeating the Anas Dabbashi Brigade following three weeks of intense fighting that ultimately left 39 people dead and 300 others wounded. HoR meeting to discuss the LPA planned for 9 October, was postponed after protestors blocked the building entrances.

The clashes between the Dabbashi brigade and the more pro-LNA Anti-ISIS Operation Room have continued unabated in Sabratha with use of heavy artillery, despite attempts by different actors to establish a ceasefire. So far, 26 people have been killed, 170 wounded and thousands displaced from the city centre. In Tripoli, 2 Nawasi fighters were killed by Tajouri’s forces, sparking tensions.

Protests led by Basit Igtet in Marytrs square drew crowds but not as many as expected and the protest appeared to fizzle out without incident. Clashes in Sabratha between Dabbashi and Anti-ISIS force have escalated with civilians killed and other forces attempting to mobilize from Zawiyya and Watiya airbase to support their allies.

On 16 September, clashes broke out in Sabratha among units affiliated with the Anas Dabbashi Brigade and the 48 Brigade, leaving at least five dead and 18 injured. LNA air force jets flew over the city on 18 September, triggering local fears that the LNA might intervene if the clashes escalate further. A brief ceasefire was announced on 18 September for an ICRC led evacuation though it is reported that the gun fighting continued.

On 9 September GNA PM Serraj, HoR President Saleh and the head of the High Council of State Swehli attended African Union summit on Libya in Brazzaville, Congo. The Shahid Nouri Friwan Brigade stated its support for Basit Igtet’s presidential bid and warned “against [those] trying to silence people’s voices” during Igtet’s planned demonstrations in Tripoli later this month. Mohamed al-Senussi, stated that elections will not be possible and instead called for the restoration of Libya’s 1951 post-independence constitution.

On 30 August, Serraj appointed a Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army under the GNA, a move rejected by the LNA. On 1 September, a Zawiyya militia attacked a demonstration in commemoration of Gaddafi’s revolution, organised by local rivals affiliated with the LNA.

Haftar, Nayed and Igtit have indirectly launched their bids for candidacy in prospective presidential elections in 2018. In a video resignation, Mustafa Abu Shagour pointed to Ageelah Saleh and the HoR’s reluctance to move forward with amendments to the LPA as major reason for his departure.

Saiqa initially rejected the ICC arrest warrant issued for al-Warfalli on 15 August, but now reports that he is suspended pending investigation. A delegation from Derna led by the head of the Derna municipal council met with Serraj on 15 August to discuss the on going siege on the city. On 16 August, internal clashes broke out between Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Omar al-Mukhtar Operations Room over control at the Martuba checkpoint which controls entry into Derna.

The recent political rapprochement attempts between Fayez al-Serraj, Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar, may be in jeopardy as recent statements from the LNA hint that Haftar is still intent on gain control of the capital though military measures.

On 1-3 August, Egypt facilitated mediation talks between LNA and Misratan delegations in Cairo. A understanding between both delegations hinged on respect of Libya’s unity and sovereignty, efforts to avoid bloodshed, build a civilian state, discard all kinds of foreign intervention and fight terrorism and criminal groups, including militias.

On 29 July, a majority of Libya’s CDA voted to approve the latest draft of the Libyan constitution draft, even as local and armed protestors attempted to disrupt the vote and assaulted some CDA members. The Head of the CDA formally issued the constitution draft on 31 July, and with HoR approval the document should progress to a national referendum within the next 30 days.

On 25 July, LNA Commander Haftar and GNA PM Serraj have ‘committed to a ceasefire’ with promises to use force for counter-terrorism efforts only, and to work towards holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Spring of 2018. Misrata and other Islamist-affiliated members of the PC fear they might loose their role in Libyan power politics if the HCS is dissolved as an interim institution in exchange for new parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 14 July, Government of National Accord (GNA) President Fayez Serraj announced a new plan to realize the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which would include parliamentary AND Presidential elections by March 2018. Also on the docket is the establishment of a high national reconciliation council, large scale disarmament, demobilisation of militias, and major economic reforms. […]

On 9 July, major clashes broke out between pro and anti Government of National Accord (GNA) militias in Garaboulli, 30km east of Tripoli, after anti-GNA militias deployed forces with vehicles and heavy artillery to the area in a new bid to march on the capital and overthrow the GNA.

On 2 July, 16 senior political figures from Misrata attended a high profile meeting in Egypt at the invitation of the Egyptian Chief of Staff and the Foreign Minister. On 28 June, Libya’s eastern foreign minister visited Russia to discuss options for a new Libyan-Libyan dialogue

Last week, Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar met with the heads of various eastern Libyan tribes in the LNA headquarters of Rajmah in Benghazi. 

On 17 June, a convoy of anti-GNA militias from Misrata attempted to deploy to Tripoli. However, they reportedly became divided among themselves, cancelled the deployment and most of them drove back to Misrata. On 15 June, 46 HoR members formed a new bloc called the ‘National Consensus Bloc’.

A Zintani militia claims to have released Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi while the HoR releases a blacklist of Libyan individuals and entities it claims are linked to terrorist activities through Qatar.

On 26 May, pro-GNA Tripoli militias evicted rival anti-GNA militias from the capital, taking over key sites including Hadba prison. 52 people were killed in the fighting. The LNA recognised the pro-GNA militias’ efforts against ‘Islamist terrorists’.

Anti- GNA militias mobilized south of Tripoli and deployed forces to various locations in preparation for a new operation in the capital dubbed ‘Libya Honor’ while Serraj missed a scheduled meeting with Haftar in Cairo.

On 9 May, the GNA-aligned Nawasi brigade reportedly stormed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, calling for PM Fayez al-Serraj to dismiss Mohamed Taher Siala as the minister after he called Haftar the legitimate commander of the Libyan Army.

The LNA-GNA conflict escalates as the LNA increases airstrikes in the southwest, targeting key GNA airbases Teminhint and Jufra. The GNA calls for international assistance to end the proxy war in the South. GNA Defence Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier Mohammed Al-Ghousri, says that Haftar’s end is imminent with western intervention and a no-fly zone in southern Libya.

Clashes escalated last week between the LNA and the GNA in south-west Libya as the LNA bombed Teminhint airbase and GNA-aligned Misratan forces bombed Brak al-Shati airbase. At least 10 fighters have been killed.

The HoR voted on its terms for participating in the LPA including reducing the PC to three members, keeping only original GNC members in the HCS, and recognizing the LNA as Libya’s sole legitimate armed force.

The GNA established a 3,000-strong ‘Sirte protection’ force from the BM forces that fought ISIS in Sirte. The HoR called it a ‘terrorist’ force while the LNA appointed Qadhafi-era commander to head its Sirte ops room

After clashes escalated in Tripoli last week, rifts within Misrata deepened as pro-GNA militias evicted Khalifa al-Ghwell from the Rixos compound and protests took place on Tripoli and Misrata

Clashes erupted on 13/14 March in western Tripoli between Tripoli militias including Kara and Tajouri’s forces on one side, and Amazigh and Misratan militias on the other.

The PC issued a statement condemning the BDB’s attack on the oil crescent on 3 March, however two PC members have publically said they support the BDB while GNA MoD has also been accused of supporting the attacking force .

On 22 February, Abdul Razzaq al-Nadhouri introduced a new measure banning all 18-45 year olds (male and female) in eastern Libya from travel without a security permit. In Tripoli, heavy clashes erupted between pro and anti GNA militias leading to several deaths.

On 20 February, a motorcade transporting GNA officials was fired upon during a visit to a security department in the capital. In the east, the LNA introduced a controversial travel ban preventing women under the age of 60 from travelling without a ‘mahram’.

On 9 February, forces who oppose the UN-backed GNA announced the formation of the ‘Libyan National Guard’ (LNG) in Tripoli. A number of militias from western Libya announced they had joined the LNG forces and clashes broke out with rival factions in capital.

Local sources in Jufra report a new mobilization by GNA/Islamist affiliated groups who reportedly plan to attack Ras Lanuf port in the coming weeks. Rivalries between militias of various factions in Tripoli are escalating, with various rival armed groups implicated in clashes, kidnappings and armed assault.

On 24 January, the Libyan Political Dialogue Group signed an agreement accepting six changes to the LPA, including reducing the PC membership to three and creating a new council to assume the powers of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army.

In Tripoli, sporadic clashes took place last week between various militias affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA), and other hard-line anti-Haftar, Islamist militias nominally loyal to Khalifa al-Ghwell. Ghniwa’s forces attempted to retake control of the Ministry of Labor buildings at Hadba near the Military Academy buildings. The MoL building was taken over by al-Ghwell’s militias last week in an attempted ‘coup’.

On 12 January, militias allied to Khalifa al-Ghwell, leader of a rival government in Tripoli, seized several ministerial buildings in Tripoli, while the whole of western and southern Libya continues to suffer chronic power outages, provoking tensions and anti-GNA sentiment

The Misratan Third Force retook the Gweirat al-Mal checkpoint from the LNA, while LNA fighters conducted airstrikes against Jufra airbase, injuring the head of Misrata Military Council. This lead to calls for all Misratans to mobilize against Haftar in the south, while protests were held in the south calling for Misrata to withdraw.

New hostilities between Misratan forces and the LNA threaten to destabilize southern Libya and weaken the GNA. Deputy PM Musa al-Koni resigned his position on the PC, saying it had failed the Libyan people, while the PC agreed the new 2017 Libyan budget and issued some major security decisions.

A number of incidents in Misrata and Tripoli have increased tensions within Misratan ranks, with a key Misratan cleric being abducted and tortured last week, while clashes broke out again in Tripoli.

Haftar and the LNA attempt to exert their influence in western Libya, announcing that a new offensive to take Tripoli is ‘imminent’ and mobilising LNA forces south of Zawiyya.

The LNA defeated a counter-attack on the oil crescent launched from Jufra by allied forces including Jadhran loyalists, BDB fighters and some GNA forces. The attacking convoy was routed and the LNA even extended its control south of Jufra, all the way to Brak al-Shati. In Tripoli, tensions are high as anti-GNA Misratan forces mobilize to support the anti-GNA Islamist coalition, while protests took place after a video of militiamen raping a woman was released.

Clashes in Libya indicate that the GNA is unable to control its own capital, further weakening its support in western Libya and hence its negotiating position. However, the declaration of BM forces’ victory against ISIS in Sirte could give the GNA a temporary boost in popularity given BM is nominally controlled by the GNA.

Prime Minister of the GNA Fayez Serraj said that the PC will not submit a new Cabinet line-up to the HOR until it has approved the LPA, while civil disobedience protests take place in Tripoli over liquidity crisis.

Tensions continue to grow between various anti-GNA, Islamist and pro-GNA factions across the country. The prospect of an Islamist offensive against the LNA in the oil crescent, supported by the GNA, remains possible, while in Tripoli, there are fears of imminent clashes between hardliners allied with the Mufti and pro-GNA Tripoli militias like RADA.

PM Fayez Serraj and his allies are taking active measures to entrench the GNA’s de facto control in the capital by creating new security forces and appointing ministers, provoking fears in Eastern Libya that the GNA intends to ‘go it alone’.

GNA Defence Minister Mahdi al-Barghathi condemned Haftar and the LNA last week, accusing them of carrying out assassinations and human rights abuses in eastern Libya. The LNA fears Barghati is allying with BDB militias and Jadhran loyalists to launch a counter-attack on the oil crescent.

Rapprochement efforts between the LNA and Misratan factions which side step the UN-process appear to be bearing fruit, with the pro-Haftar HoR President Agilah Saleh holding a flurry of meetings with rival politicians and militias this week. In western Libya, clashes have broken out in Zawiyya while in Tripoli, inter-militia tensions, crime and lawlessness are growing.

The GNA and other LPA institutions continue to weaken and fragment, while tensions between (and within) pro-Haftar, Misratan and Islamist factions continues to deepen.

Last week, the Libyan political process was made even more complex and confusing when a former PM led a self-declared coup attempt against the GNA in Tripoli. The GNA condemned the move but some anti-GNA factions and militias are rallying around the coup-makers.

On 7 October, the Presidential Council met with all of its members in Tunis, but little came of the meeting. Although Haftar is consolidating his control over Eastern Libya, and is using this as leverage to gain greater power within negotiations, he is struggling to exert his control over western and southern Libya.

Haftar and the LNA continue to consolidate power in eastern Libyan through the militarization of governance in the region, while internecine tensions within Tripoli and Misrata are growing.

Political tensions and rifts between hardline pro and anti LNA factions are growing after Haftar’s seizure of the oil crescent ports. The High Council of State last week declared it was taking legislative power from the HoR due to its support for Haftar and his military takeover, although this statement has been widely rejected by local and international actors.

The anti-ISIS coalition, such as exists, is in a state of flux after Haftar’s seizure of the oil ports. Misratan officials have said that they will not go to war against the LNA to support Jadhran, however after Haftar’s forces succeeded in repelling a counter attack against the Sidra and Ras Lanuf ports, they pushed to within 50km of Sirte where Misrata are currently battling ISIS.

On 11 September, General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) announced and launched a secretive military operation named Sudden Lightening, and by 12 September the LNA had taken full military control of the Oil Crescent. Ras Lanuf, Sidra and Zuetina oil ports were wrested away from Ibrahim Jadhran’s Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), and are now under control of the House of Representatives-aligned (HoR) LNA.

The political process in Libya is headed towards a new stage of dysfunction. The Presidential Council (PC) has not yet agreed a new ministerial list for the Government of National Accord (GNA), and fresh divisions are emerging within the House of Representatives (HoR).

At the moment of partial victory in Sirte, various pillars that should make up the anti-ISIS coalition are feuding with each other. The House of Representatives (HoR) has rejected the Government of National Accord, while the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) are facing increasing tension over Zuetina in the oil crescent, and various interests are preventing oil production in order to seek their own demands.

On 22 August, the HoR managed to hold its first session since February 2016 with the required legal quorum. Of the 101 members in attendance, 61 voted no-confidence on the current GNA cabinet, but gave the Presidential Council a final opportunity to submit an amended cabinet for a possible future endorsement vote. This latest development is quite a blow to the internationally recognized GNA, as certain ministers have already assumed their mandates, but may have to now be replaced… In Western Libya, the conflict map is becoming slightly more complicated. The main tension inside the capital is between pro-GNA militias and anti-GNA Islamist/Misratan affiliated factions, signaling a very likely conflict between these militias after the victory in Sirte is secured.

New political wrangling within the GNA is widening rifts even further. On 10 August, the Presidential Council issued a statement threatening to nominate replacement candidates if two of its boycotting members, Ali Al Gatrani and Omar Laswad, did not rejoin within one week. The statement caused uproar among anti-GNA factions across Libya… Meanwhile, the GNA is unlikely to receive a significant boost in legitimacy or popular support until a total victory is achieved by Bunyan Marsus against ISIS in Sirte. However, even if this ISIS is crushed by the coalition, the GNA is not guaranteed to survive.

At the time of writing (early August 2016), divisions between Haftar’s LNA, the GNA’s Banyan Marsus, and Ibrahim Jadhran’s Petroleum Facilities Gaurds have never been greater.

In Benghazi, the Libyan National Army (LNA) captured the symbolic Guwarsha checkpoint from Islamist militants on 28 July. The Islamists retaliated with suicide car bomb attacks on 29 July that killed two LNA soldiers and wounded four, while ISIS conducted another on 30 July near the Guwarsha Chinese flats, injuring three soldiers… Meanwhile, the LNA has reconsolidated its control in southwest Benghazi, after successfully repelling an attack by the Benghazi Defense Brigade.

On 22 July, large demonstrations took place in Tripoli, Misrata, Zawiyya, Zuwara and others denouncing the discovery of French fighters acting in coordination with Khalifa Haftar as evidence of a French invasion, and breaching of the internationally recognized political agreement. Anti-Government of National Accord (GNA) forces are using the event to re-consolidate political forces that had fragmented after the GNA replaced the former Islamist-aligned General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli on 30 March 2016… The credibility of the LNA took another severe hit after 14 bodies were discovered on 21 July in a rubbish dump in Benghazi, an area supposedly ‘liberated’ from ISIS in March 2016.

The Misratan-led Bunyan Marsus anti-ISIS campaign in Sirte suffered setbacks on 15 July when at least 20 men were killed in multiple suicide attacks by ISIS militants… Security threats in the oil crescent are dramatically increasing, with higher prospects of a larger conflict in the short-medium term. On 17 July, fighting broke out between Libyan National Army (LNA) units, supported by local volunteers, and Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB) in the town of Magrun, only 70 kilometers southwest of Benghazi… The BDB’s momentum is intensifying rifts in the region, especially between the LNA and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) commanded by Ibrahim Jadhran.

On 6 July, the Libyan National Army (LNA) suffered major blows, with the death of 11 soldiers in a suicide attack, and downing of its ace Mig-23 pilot Major Idris Hamed Al-Obeidi. Obeidi, an iconic LNA fighter pilot, was killed when his plane crashed during a mission against jihadists in Ganfuda. On 10 July, Tariq Al Saiti, another iconic LNA solider who specialized in de-mining and was a highly respected figure in Benghazi, was killed. These setbacks have dampened the high hopes for a swift and decisive defeat of jihadists in eastern Libya.

Three key developments were identified last week: 1) The unabated momentum of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Bunyan Marsus coalition against ISIS in Sirte, 2) the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) surge eradicated the remaining pockets of jihadi fighters in southwestern Benghazi and 3) and the influence of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) in the oil crescent has taken a significant hit.

In the coming weeks, Libya’s oil crescent is likely to witness increased tension between three actors: the Libyan National Army (LNA), the Government of National Accord-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), and renegade Islamist militias… The reversal of military momentum once more in favour of the LNA, coupled with the Islamist subversion of the GNA’s anti-ISIS, efforts is bolstering the political position of Haftar and anti-GNA factions… After several Islamist militias broke away from the GNA’s Bunyan Marsus coalition and attacked Ajdabiya on 18 June, the GNA’s political position in the oil crescent was severely compromised, and with it the standing of PFG forces loyal to Ibrahim Jadhran… Meanwhile, the GNA is still holed up in Abu Setta naval base, while other militias affiliated to Islamist forces have a freer hand in the Tripoli.

The political damage to the Government of National Accord (GNA), following the attack on Ajdabiya on 18 June by Islamist militias, may undo fragile militia alliances in Tripoli and key towns in western Libya. Meanwhile, an escalation of open conflict between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Islamist militias from western Libya is now very likely, and could potentially spill over into a broader tribal/regional conflict involving the LNA and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG).

As militias nominally aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) made highly impressive gains against ISIS in Sirte last week, and a degree of euphoria has gripped international actors and some GNA supporters, these gains have not automatically led to authentic political unity among Libya’s major anti-ISIS factions. To the contrary, prospects for unity and strengthened political legitimacy for the GNA are lower, and the likelihood of renewed civil conflict higher, due to three factors identified this week.

The Government of National Accord’s (GNA) establishment of the Adjabiya-Sirte operations room to coordinate the anti-ISIS campaign from the east, and de-facto reinstatement of Ibrahim Jadhran as head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) in the central region, in tandem with the PFG attack on ISIS in Libya’s oil crescent, signals that a deal has been made between the GNA and local actors in the oil crescent that circumvents Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). While this dynamic effectively puts the GNA in a firm position to negotiate workable, yet temporary, alliances with rival militias to focus on the fight against ISIS, it threatens to expose the GNA to hijacking by groups that are not under its direct control, and who have no other overlapping interests than the defeat of ISIS in Sirte.

The Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Bunyan Marsus operations room, led by Misratan Colonel Bashir Al Gadi, made significant gains against ISIS this week, advancing to within 30 kilometres of Sirte…On May 30, the Petroleoum Facilities Guard (PFG) made significant gains against ISIS from the east. PFG units took control of a number of oil fields last week, including Al Jabal and Waha Al Waha.

Despite the setbacks suffered at the start of the GNA’s Misratan-led operation to liberate Sirte, as well as the high number of causalities already sustained, militias from Misrata and western Libya continue to join the effort. On 18 May, ISIS outflanked the Misratans at Al Wishka and Buwirat Al Hasoun. Thirty-two fighters from the Bunyan Marsous Operations Room were killed in Buwirat Al Hasoun, and another 50 were injured.

In eastern Libya, the Libyan National Army (LNA) is preparing for a new offensive against the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC) and other jihadists belonging to Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Sharia (AAS). On 11 May, LNA spokesperson Ahmed El Mesmari held a press conference in Benghazi to outline the LNA’s progress in Derna. He […]

Three separate operations rooms to combat ISIS were established last week. It is quite clear that each actor wishes to control the operation to liberate Sirte, rather than genuinely cooperate with its adversaries. On 5 May, the Presidential Council issued its first resolution, establishing a special operations room for military operations against ISIS in the […]

The battle to liberate Sirte from IS was long seen by supporters of the UN deal as the national unity project gelling the rival actors into an internationally supported, locally led anti-ISIS coalition. However current realities appear to paint a different picture. Over the last week, political divisions are shaping the battle as a competitive […]

The sudden ISIS withdrawal from Derna on 20 April, and the lack of combat between ISIS convoys and LNA, has revived suspicions among Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC) supporters that the LNA and ISIS are collaborating. Furthermore, the civilian casualties resulting from five consecutive days of LNA airstrikes against DMSC positions in Derna have enflamed […]

The Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) attacked an ISIS convoy en-route to Bin Jawwad on 16 April, killing ISIS senior commander Abu Hamza Al Jazairi. Al Jazairi is said to have lead ISIS missions in Bin Jawwad and Ras Lanuf. Three other ISIS militants, two Algerians and one Tunisian, were injured in the attack, as the […]

On 12 April, the Libyan Air Force (LAF) conducted an airstrike targeting an ISIS convoy traveling from Sirte towards Sidra. The LAF may soon have a new MiG-23 entering service, following refurbishment and outfitting the plane with new a night vision system, missiles, guided bombs and a refueling system. Multiple airstrikes also occurred in Benghazi […]

The UN-mediated Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) arrived at the naval base in Tripoli on 30 March aboard a Libyan Navy boat sailing from Tunisia. Commanders of the Libyan Navy helped secure the safe entry and protection of the Presidency Council on the base. However, the regularised local militias in Souq […]

Nascent anti-ISIS military alliances in both western and eastern Libyan are fraying. On 28 March, a large block of Misrata’s militias issued a statement in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and said they would prepare to mobilise to Tripoli to help secure the GNA. This block was confronted by another group of […]

The anti-ISIS coalition in Derna is showing signs of stress. On 21 March, the day after the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC) released a video the interrogation of captured ISIS members, the DMSC executed eight of the detainees. This act has increased tensions between the groups, as well as their supporters, which has been steadily growing […]