On 3 September, the UN Human Rights Council released a report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan (Sudan Fact-Finding Mission or FFM), titled ‘Fuelling Sudan’s conflict: weapons, fighters and external support networks’. Evidence verified by the mission, including from witnesses with first-hand information, provides reasonable grounds to believe that private companies, logistics brokers and recruiters based in several countries, including Colombia and the United Arab Emirates, have used transit and logistic hubs in Chad, southeastern Libya and Bosaso in Puntland/Somalia to move personnel, training, weapons and other support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. This transnational network played an important role in advancing the RSF capacity to sustain operations in Darfur, Kordofan, and other regions in Sudan through interconnected air, land, and maritime supply.
The FFM stated that it received credible information indicating that, from at least April 2025, weapons, military equipment and other supplies transferred to the RSF included material consistent with equipment previously exported to the United Arab Emirates. Witnesses and other independent sources described artillery systems (including Chinese NORINCO AH-4 155mm howitzers), air-defense systems (including Chinese FK-2000 self-propelled, short to medium-range surface-to-air missile system), radars, armored vehicles, Land Cruisers, uniforms, ammunition, weapons and medical supplies transferred through regional routes involving Bosaso in Puntland/Somalia, Benghazi, Kufra and Jufra in Libya, and Chad before reaching RSF-controlled areas.
Bosaso was identified as a recurrent logistics and transit hub used by external actors, including UAE‑based individuals and entities, to move personnel and cargo bound for RSF‑controlled areas. Sources reported Ilyushin‑76 cargo flights linking Bosaso with Kufra, Benghazi, and various locations in Chad, from which materiel and personnel were subsequently routed into Sudan.
Witnesses described several deployment routes used to move Colombian contractors into Sudan. Early groups reportedly transited the UAE, Bosaso, and Benghazi, then crossed southern Libyan desert corridors into Darfur. Later groups also travelled via Bosaso or the UAE, passing through Chad before entering Sudan through Nyala Airport (in southwestern Sudan).
Foreign‑supported RSF logistics and training in Libya centered on Benghazi, Kufra, and Jufra, which the report described as hubs for incoming weapons, vehicles, fuel, food, and personnel before onward movement into Sudan, aided by Libyan National Army (LNA) units such as the Subul al‑Salam Battalion. Benghazi and Kufra hosted specialized training sites where RSF fighters received technical instruction on AK‑47s, RPGs, and DShK heavy machine guns, as well as in drone operations, including from foreign trainers such as Colombian nationals. Courses lasted up to three months, with trainers accompanying deployed RSF units for roughly a month in Kordofan, Darfur, and other theatres. Jufra operated both as a training camp for fighters from Sudan, Chad, and other states and as a transit node between Benghazi and Sudan. Verified open‑source evidence shows RSF fighters trained in Libya later took part in the Zamzam camp attack (April 2025) and the El‑Fasher assault (October 2025).
The FFM noted that it did not receive substantive cooperation from several contacted states, including Libya. It sought information from the relevant states regarding activities occurring within or through their territories. Requests for information were sent to Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia, Panama, and South Sudan, but no substantive replies were received. Libya responded, stating that its ambassador was unavailable for a meeting, yet did not address the mission’s inquiry. The mission urged these countries to engage with its work, particularly given the evidence of illicit activities originating from their territory documented in this report.