On 2 April, Radio France International (RFI) revealed an “exclusive RFI investigation into a shadow war taking place on the African continent between Kyiv and Moscow, in Libya”.
According to the widely quoted report, RFI has learned that Ukraine was responsible for the attack on 4 March 2026 on the Russian LNG tanker Arctic Metagaz and that Kyiv maintains a discreet but substantial military presence in western Libya. According to “two very well-informed Libyan sources, who spoke to us on condition of anonymity”, more than 200 Ukrainian officers and specialists are deployed in the country with the approval of the Tripoli‑based government of PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba. They operate from three sites.
The first is the Air Force Academy in Misrata, according to RFI a major hub already hosting Turkish and Italian forces, AFRICOM personnel, and a British intelligence facility. A second Ukrainian base is located in Zawiyya, roughly 50 kilometers from Tripoli and “close to the Mellitah oil complex”. There, Ukrainian teams occupy a coastal plot granted by the Tripoli authorities, which was fortified and equipped in autumn 2025 to support aerial and naval drone operations. A third site, at the headquarters of the Libyan Army’s 111th Brigade on the road to Tripoli Airport, serves as a venue for coordination meetings between Ukrainian officers and western Libyan military representatives, including Ministry of Defense Undersecretary Abdul Salam Zoubi.
According to RFI, the deployment stems from an agreement concluded in October 2025 at the request of Ukraine’s military attaché in Algiers, “General Andrei Bayuk”. In exchange for allowing a Ukrainian presence, Tripoli receives training, particularly in drone operations, and, over time, access to arms sales and Ukrainian investment in the oil sector. Ukrainian authorities did not respond to RFI’s inquiries, and the Dabaiba government has remained silent despite being “questioned by the Libyan parliament based in Benghazi”.
According to RFI, the 4 March strike was not the first Ukrainian operation at sea off Libya. On 19 December 2025, a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) source told AFP that Kyiv had hit a Russian “ghost fleet” oil tanker in Mediterranean “neutral waters.” The vessel, the Qendil, was sailing between Greece and Libya, roughly 250 kilometers off the Libyan coast, when it was targeted. According to information obtained by RFI, the attack was carried out by a drone launched from Misrata. Kyiv released a short video showing the tanker ablaze but offered no details about the launch site or the country from which the operation was conducted.
On 3 April, RFI claimed that according to its investigation, sources claim the crash of the plane carrying Libyan Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammed al‑Haddad and his delegation in Turkey on 23 December 2025 may have been a direct Russian retaliation for an attack on the Russian oil tanker Qendil on 19 December. The sources say the tanker had been transporting a senior Russian official, General Andrei Averyanov, the deputy head of Russian military intelligence (GRU) and current commander of the Russian Africa Corps, along with around ten other Russian intelligence officers, making the incident highly sensitive for Moscow.
The attack was reportedly carried out by Ukrainian aerial drones launched from Misrata, prompting Russia to vow a response within days. Less than a week after that threat, al‑Haddad and his companions died when their aircraft went down in Turkey. According to RFI, the circumstances remain unclear, and the analysis of the plane’s black boxes has not yet been released. RFI also noted that the sabotage operation targeting the oil pipeline in the al-Hamada al-Hamra region in mid-March may have been a response to the attack on the Arctic Metagaz.
On 3 April, Ukrainian media reported about the “exclusive RFI investigation” into an alleged Ukrainian military presence in Libya. They said that if verified, the Ukrainian deployment in Libya would represent a major extension of Kyiv’s operational reach and signal that its confrontation with Russia is becoming increasingly global, stretching beyond Europe into strategically important regions such as Africa and the Mediterranean.
On 4 April, the Russian Embassy in Libya criticized the RFI report on Russia and Libya, arguing that the outlet relies on vague language and anonymous sources rather than verifiable facts. Phrases such as “according to our sources” and “is believed to have been killed” are cited as evidence that the story is based on rumour rather than investigation. The statement insists there is no official confirmation for RFI’s claims and dismisses the report as speculation. It concludes by assuring audiences in France and Libya that General Averyanov is alive, suggesting that RFI’s narrative about “revenge for his death” is unfounded.
Shortly thereafter, RFI apologized to its readers, stating that it overlooked several indications that General Averyanov was still alive after the date RFI claimed he had died. The president of Madagascar’s National Assembly confirmed that Averyanov led a Russian delegation visiting the country on 20 December 2025. Russian media later reported that he met a Malagasy delegation in Moscow in February.