On 28 July, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted with twelve votes in favour and three abstentions to extend the mandate of the United Nations...
Results for "UNSMIL"
On 22 July, United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a statement condemning the clashes in Tripoli and called for all actors to...
On 29 April, the UN Security Council (UNSC) extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 31 July 2022. The UK,...
On 19 April, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held consultations on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the mandate of...
On 22 March, the UN’s Special Advisor of the Secretary General (SASG) on Libya, Stephanie Williams, convened the first meeting of the 6+6 Joint...
On 10 March, UNSMIL issued a statement saying that it was closely following with concern reports about the mobilization of forces and movement of...
On 31 January, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted for a technical roll over of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) mandate for three months...
Throughout the last week, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Advisor on Libya, Stephanie Williams, continued their...
On 21 December, UNSMIL issued a statement expressing concern at the unfolding security situation in Tripoli. It stated that the mobilisation of...
On 3 September, the UN Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL), issued a statement expressing ‘grave concern about ongoing armed clashes, including the...
On 18 August, following military activity in Al-Shwayrif, the UN Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL), called on Libyan parties ‘to refrain from any...
On 31 July, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is due to receive an independent strategic review of the UN Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL). The...
On 31 July, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is due to receive an independent strategic review of the UN Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL). The...
On 15 January, the UNSC approved Jan Kubis as the new SRSG and Head of UNSMIL to replace Stephanie Williams. On 19 January, UNSMIL announced that the LPDF has agreed on a mechanism for selecting the reformed PC and new executive authority in Libya.
6-13 January: UNSMIL announces its expectation that international monitors will be deployed to support the Libyan ceasefire
On 6 January, UNSMIL announced that it had convened the second virtual meeting of the LPDF’s Advisory Committee. On 9 January, UNSMIL issued a statement announcing its “expectation” that international monitors will be deployed to support Libya’s 5+5 ceasefire agreement.
16-22 December: UNSMIL confirms LPDF is unable to agree on new Libyan transitional executive authority
On 14 December, clashes occurred between the Sirte Military Police and the LNA’s 128 Brigade. On 15 December, UNSMIL confirmed that the LPDF is unable to agree on a new Libyan transitional executive authority. On 16 December, the GNA Minister of Defence announced he had formed a committee to follow up on LNA ‘war crimes’.
On 1 November, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams met with Deputy PM of the GNA, Maiteeq to discuss the LPDF. On 1 November, head of the HCS, al-Mishri and an accompanying delegation arrived in Doha to meet with the emir of Qatar, al-Thani. On 1 November, the Russian representative to the UNSC, Nebenzia, reportedly announced Russia’s full support for the exit of all foreign mercenaries from Libya. On 2 November, the US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, travelled to Moscow. On 31 October, Speaker of HoR, Saleh arrived in Cairo.
On 14 September, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that consultations between Turkish and Russian interagency delegations on Libya and Syria will continue at a technical level. The same day, it was reported that the UNSC was planning on approving former Bulgarian politician and UN diplomat Nickolai Evtimov Mladenov as the new head of UNSMIL. On 10 September, participants of a two-day consultation held in Montreux, Switzerland under the auspices of the HD announced a supposed agreement on a roadmap for a comprehensive solution to the Libyan conflict. On 10 September, German and Italian warships intercepted an oil tanker on its way to Libya from the UAE suspected of carrying ‘a load of jet fuel likely to be used for military purposes.’
On 1 June, UNSMIL released a statement welcoming agreement from both the GNA and LNA to resume talks based on the 5 + 5 Joint Military Commission (JMC). On 27 May, the Speaker of the HoR, Saleh, met in al-Qubah with the LNA General Command. On 28 May, the GNA removed the Minister of Economy, al-Issawi.
On 21 March, the UNSMIL welcomed the “positive responses” by the GNA and LNA to the ceasefire calls. However, fighting does not appear to have ceased on Tripoli’s southern frontlines. On 23 March, Serraj held a phone call with Italian Prime Minister Conte. On 18 March, the GNA’s Ministry of Interior announced that it would be signing a contract for the purchase of an Airbus 135 and Airbus 145.
The HoR and the HCS refused to attend the UNSMIL-mediated political dialogue talks which began in Geneva on 26 February. The LNA continues to undertake indirect fire attacks on Tripoli.
On 23 January, Algerian Foreign Minister Boukadoum held a meeting with foreign ministers from Mali, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia, the latter five nations sharing a common border with Libya. On 23 January, Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis stated the EU would not agree to a political solution to the Libya crisis while the GNA and Turkey maintain their maritime MoU. On 26 January, Turkish President Erdogan, met with Algerian Prime Minister, Tebboune, in Algeria. On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Maas met EU High Representative Borrell to discuss the situation in Libya. On 27 January, UNSMIL issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya”.
On 6 October, UNSMIL published a statement condemning airstrikes on the Equestrian Club in Tripoli’s Janzour neighbourhood. On 4 October, UNSMIL issued a statement expressing alarm at “indications that parallel, unrecognized authorities in Libya” are threatening the NOC and its subsidiary Brega.
On 22 July, UNSMIL announced the reopening of bids for the selection of an international audit firm to audit the financial accounts of the competing Central Bank of Libya CBL branches.
On 5 May, UNSMIL called for a week-long humanitarian truce to start on 6 May at 4:00am (local time), coinciding with the beginning of Ramadan.
On 9 September, UNSMIL gathered together the key rival factions involved in the militia clashes in Tripoli that began on 26 August to sign an eight-point agreement that included a pledge to refrain from extorting sovereign institutions. This is the second meeting in over a fortnight, with the first initiating the current ceasefire.
4 Apr – 10 Apr: UN release a report on armed groups control of prisons while UNSMIL launch first round of ‘consultative meetings’
On 10 April, the UN released a report exploring armed groups control of prisons in Libya, the subsequent torturing of detainees and how successive government in Tripoli have been inability to curtail these activities. On 5 April, UNSMIL launched its first round of ‘consultative meetings’ in Benghazi and Zuwara, as part of the UN-initiated Libya National Forum followed by meetings in Ghariyan and Brak al-Shatti on 7 April and in Abu Salim on 10 April.
On 19 December, the House of Representatives voted for a new Central Bank of Libya (CBL) governor, replacing incumbent Al-Seddiq Al-Kabir with former Deputy Governor Mohammed Al-Shukri. The UN Special Mission in Libya has rejected the appointment saying that it violates article 15 of the Libyan Political Agreement and must be done within its accord. […]
On 15 October, the UN Support Mission in Libya’s (UNSMIL) new Joint Drafting Committee, including members of both the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS), met again in Tunis to negotiate amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). In particular, they debated the final draft articles concerning the appointment of the Prime Minister (PM), the Government and the new Presidential Council (PC).
Last week, the UN held a conference in Tunis to discuss how the international community can support the GNA’s fledgling presidential guard. A number of high-level diplomatic events in Egypt, Russia and Algeria also took place that may indicate a shift towards a more Haftar-inclusive approach to the Libyan peace process at an international level.
On 13 April, the Assistant Secretary-General and Acting Head of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Raisedon Zenenga, met with Libyan...
On 13 April, the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General (SASG) on Libya, Stephanie Williams, launched consultations of the Joint Committee of...
On 4 March, the governments of France, Germany, Italy, the US and the UK released a joint statement noting the UN Secretary-General’s statement and...
On 1 March, the HoR granted confidence to Bashaagha's slightly amended Cabinet list, dubbed the Government of National Stability (GNS). At the time...
On 12 December, UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) welcomed the newly-appointed Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Libya, Stephanie...
On 11 December, the Government of National Unity (GNU) Chief of Staff, Mohammed Haddad, met with the Acting Commander of the Libyan National Army...
On 6 December, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced that he was appointing former acting UN Envoy to Libya and former Deputy Head of the...
On 24 November, UN Special Envoy to Libya, Jan Kubis, addressed the UN Security Council where he confirmed his resignation from his position with...
On 23 November, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that the Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and UN Special Envoy to Libya, Jan...
On 30 October, members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) convened in Cairo to discuss the withdrawal of foreign operatives from southern...
On 8 October, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) concluded a three-day meeting in Geneva by signing a comprehensive Action Plan ‘for the...
On 26 August UNSMIL issued a statement welcoming the formation of a joint unit composed of LNA and Misratan fighters assigned with protecting the...
On 15 July, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held a meeting on Libya chaired by French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian and attended...
How to use our archiveThe Libya Security Monitor (LSM) has an archive covering the most significant security incidents since June 2014. Our updates...
On 29 April, the fourth round of 5+5 JMC talks concluded in Sirte. On 3 May, a high-level Turkish delegation was received in Tripoli by the GNU to discuss strengthening the relations between the two countries.
On 31 March, 120 LNA prisoners who were captured in April 2019, were released from prison in Zawiyya. On 31 March, the GNU Prime Minister held his first meeting in his capacity as interim Minister of Defence with the directors of the Ministry of Defence. On 5 April, Haftar hosted the first meeting of a new forum for ‘armed forces officers’ at the LNA HQ in Rajma. On 5 April, the Vice-President of Libya’s Presidential Council announced the creation of a High National Reconciliation Commission.
On 25 March, the Egyptian President met the President of Libya’s Presidential Council, to discuss bilateral relations. On 26 March, the President of Libya’s Presidential Council met the Turkish President. On 27 March, the Head of UNSMIL, Jan Kubis, met the commander of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar.
On 3 March, Israel’s Environment Protection Minister claimed a ‘Libyan-owned pirate vessel’ committed an “act of environmental terrorism” against Israel. On 4 March, the Head UNSMIL met the Russian Foreign in Moscow to discuss political and economic developments in Libya. On 5 March, reports emerged that the Russian Wagner PMC has transferred a new group of mercenaries from Syria to fight in Libya.
On 11 February, the new President of the PC embarked on a tour of eastern Libya. On 13 February, reports circulated about the arrest of Khalid Bu Lugaib, a prominent militia leader. On 13 February, the Misrata Third Force closed the Dafniyya gate. On 15 February, the new Prime Minister designate, confirmed that his cabinet will be ready before the 21-day deadline for forming the government.
On 2 February, the UN published its Panel of Experts report on Sudan including details of the UAE’s involvement with the LNA in Libya. On 4 February, the UNSC instructed the UNSG to deploy international monitors in Libya. On 5 February, the LPDF elected Abdul Hameed Dabaiba as the new Prime Minister for Libya. On 6 February, the 5+5 JMC agreed to clear mines from Sirte ahead of the reopening of the coastal road.
On 27 January, the GNA’s Minister of Defence in the GNA, announced that 1,300 soldiers have received military training with Turkish forces in Libya. On 28 January, The Times reported that a Russian air defence missile system was secretly flown from Zuwwara to a US air base in Germany. On 28 January, the Acting Head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, called on the UNSC to pass a resolution to dissolve all parallel executive entities. On 1 February, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) opened in Geneva.
On 21 January, UNSMIL announced the start of the nomination period for the submission of candidates for the three-member Presidency Council (PC) and the post of Prime Minister. On 23 January, the 90-day deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, as agreed in the October 23 ceasefire, passed largely unheeded.
On 29 December, the GNA Foreign Minister met with his Russian counterpart to discuss political and military developments in Libya. On 30 December, the UNSG wrote to the members of the UNSC requesting the creation of a security monitoring group for Libya. On 2 January, the Acting Head UNSMIL, issued a statement announcing that UNSMIL had formed an Advisory Committee for the LPDF.
On 23 December, the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of troops to Libya for a further 18 months. On 26 December, Turkish Defence Minister and a Turkish Military delegation arrived in Tripoli for meetings with the GNA. On 27 December, an Egyptian delegation arrived in Tripoli for an official visit.
On 11 December, the GNA Defence Minister claimed in an interview that the LNA had violated its ceasefire agreement with the GNA. On 12 December, the ‘former’ commander of the TRB, Haithem Tajouri, returned to Libya. On 14 December, 32 members of the LPDF threatened to resign.
On 25 November, the US unilaterally blacklisted the Kaniyat militia. On 24 November, Speaker of the HoR, Saleh, arrived in Moscow to meet with Russian officials. On 23 November, the 5+5 JMC met with the Security Working Group formed through the so-called Berlin process of January 2020 to brief the international community.
On 25 November, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams convened the third round of virtual meetings of the LPDF. From 23 – 28 November, more than 120 deputies from the HoR, HCS, and the boycotting Tripoli-based HoR met in Tangier, Morocco. On 26 November, a European tracking system recorded that military aircraft from Turkey landing at the al-Watiya Air Base.
On 23 November, a new virtual round of the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) began. On 22 November, representatives from both the Tripoli-based and Tubruq-based House of Representatives (HoR) travelled to Tangier, Morocco. On 18 November, head of the Audit Bureau, Shakshak, referred the head of the GNA al-Serraj to the Public Prosecutor. On 18 November, the GNA’s Volcano of Rage said that Wagner mercenaries and Sudanese Janjaweed forces were still ‘flooding into’ Sirte.
On the evening of 15 November, the UN-facilitated LPDF concluded its discussions in Tunis. On 17 November, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit the Libyan capital of Tripoli and the city of Misrata. On 12 November, GNA Defence Minister al-Namroush met in Doha with Qatari Foreign Minister and Deputy PM Abdurrahman al-Thanni.
On 10 November, female lawyer and human rights activist Hanan al-Baraasi was shot dead in Benghazi. On 11 November, the GNA’s MFA announced that Libya’s borders with Tunisia would be reopening on 14 November. On 12 November, the participants of the 5+5 JMC dialogues, announced that they would ‘immediately’ reopen the main coastal road. On 14 November, the Libyan Airports Authority held a meeting with Turkey’s al-Bayrak Group to discuss plans for the development of a Misrata International Airport. On 15 November, LNA commander Haftar issued a decree appointing Major General Abdussalam al-Hassi as commander of the Benghazi-based LNA Special Forces.
On 9 November, the UN-facilitated dialogue process known as the LPDF began its first meetings in Tunis. On 3 November, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams, said that a meeting of the JMC had led to agreements for implementing the ceasefire that had been announced on 23 October. On 4 November, GNA MoI Bashaagha arrived in Cairo to discuss security cooperation with Egyptian officials. On 5 November, representatives from the HoR and the HCS met in Morocco for a third round of talks. On 6 November, the US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, spoke with GNA Foreign Minister Siyala about the US intention to secure a property in the capital Tripoli.
On 4 November, LNA Commander Haftar reportedly launched an operation in Benghazi to expand joint security cooperation. Also, on 4 November, clashes erupted in Tarhouna. On 5 November, the military spokesman of the GNA, Dara, claimed the presence of Russian Wagner mercenaries in Sirte. The same day, it was reported that Turkish troops would remain in Libya for as long as the GNA wishes. On 6 November, several citizens arriving at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport from Benina Airport in Benghazi were arrested on charges of taking part in the 2019 attack on Tripoli.
On 2 November, delegations from the GNA and LNA met in Ghadames to conduct the fifth round of talks within the framework of the 5+5 JMC. On 30 October, a spokesperson for the GNA, al-Zaklai, announced that GNA Prime Minister al-Serraj had taken back his decision to resign.
Several countries and international organizations welcomed the ceasefire announcement from 23 October. On 25 October, UNSMIL released the names of 75 delegates invited to participate in the LPDF. On 22 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov reportedly received his Turkish counterpart, Sedan Onal, in Moscow for a new round of consultations on resolving the Libyan and Syrian crises.
On 23 October, delegations from the GNA and LNA signed a ceasefire agreement. On the same day, the first commercial passenger flight from Tripoli landed at Benghazi’s Benina airport. On 20 October, GNA Commander of the Sirte-Jufra Operations Room, Beit al-Mal, called upon the head of the GNA, al-Serraj, to remove Libyan Media Foundation chief Bayou from his office. On 21 October, Sabratha armed forces clashed with the al-Shalfouh militia from Ajalat. On 24 October, spokesperson for the GNA Volcano of Rage Operation, Qananou, urged UNSMIL to send monitoring teams to Sirte, Jufra and Brak al-Shati airbase.
On 12 October, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams, met with Tunisian President Saied to begin discussing details of the LPDF scheduled to take place in Tunisia. On 14 October, Italian Foreign Minister di Maio met with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 15 October, the UN released a statement asserting that the HoR and the HCS had agreed at the end of the 11-13 October talks in Cairo. On 16 October, the GNA said that the Foreign Minister, Siyala, had met with the Turkish Ambassador to Libya, Aksen. On 17 October, it was reported that Williams had been holding a series of meetings with mayors from municipalities across Libya.
On 14 October, Rada reportedly detained the commander of the Zawiyyan Coastguard. On 15 October, GNA and LNA traded accusations of provoking altercations at the Sirte-Jufra frontline. On 16 October, the first flight from Tripoli’s Mitiga Airport arrived at Benghazi’s Benina Airport after more than a year. On 17 October, the LNA sent reinforcements belonging to the 128 Brigade. On 18 October, 12 unidentified bodies were found in mass graves in Tarhouna. On 19 October, military leaders met in Geneva for dialogues within the 5+5 JMC framework.
On 10 October, a group of EU ambassadors met with GNA Prime Minister al-Serraj in Tripoli. The same day, UNSMIL issued a press release stating that the LPDF would be held through a series of online sessions as well as face-to-face meetings. Also on 10 October, Acting Head of UNSMIL Williams said the UN would hold direct, face-to-face talks in Geneva beginning on 19 October between delegations of the 5+5 JMC. On 6 October, the UN adopted a proposal from the UNHRC to postpone investigations into human rights violations in Libya by the UN Fact-finding Mission in Libya.
On 27 September, a second round of UN-mediated meetings was set to occur in Bouznika, Morocco, but was delayed. On 5 October, Germany plans to host the second ‘Berlin Conference’. On top of all this, French President Macron signalled that Paris was seeking to hold their own ‘talks on Libya’. On 25 September, an Algerian newspaper reported that several African countries refused to accept the appointment of former Bulgarian politician and UN diplomat Mladenov as the new UN Special Envoy. On 23 September, EU foreign policy chief Borrell announced that the EU was lifting sanctions on head of the HoR, Saleh, and President of the GNC Abu-Sahmain.
On 28 September, military and police delegations from western and eastern Libya met in Egypt. On 24 September, violent clashes reportedly occurred between GNA-aligned forces in Tajoura. On 23 September, LNA Commander Haftar and Speaker of the HoR Saleh met in Cairo with Egyptian President al-Sisi. On 23 September, a Mi-24 helicopter crashed at Sawknah. On 21 September, renewed protests against corruption occurred in Benghazi.
On 17 September, details emerged of a Russian-brokered deal between the PC/GNA Deputy Prime Minister Maiteeq and Khalid Haftar, son of the head of the LNA. Also on 17 September, the UN released a statement welcoming Serraj’s announcement to resign. On 21 September, the EU imposed sanctions on 3 companies and 2 Libyan individuals.
On 15 September, new reports emerged stating that head of the GNA, al-Serraj, was planning to resign. From 11-13 September, protests occurred throughout eastern Libya. On 13 September, the eastern-based Interim Government submitted its resignation to the Speaker of the Tubruq-based House of Representatives (HoR), Aqeela Saleh. On 11 September, participants in the so-called Libya Dialogue held in Bouznika, Morocco stated that they had agreed upon ‘criteria, transparent mechanisms and objectives’ for the appointments of new individuals to key posts.
On 6 September, delegations representing the HoR and HCS met under the auspices of UNSMIL and Moroccan Foreign Minister, Bourita, in Morocco. On 7 September, head of the GNA, Serraj was received by Turkish President Erdogan in Istanbul for a closed-door meeting. On 2 September, the acting head of the UNSMIL, Williams, said to the UNSC that foreign supporters in Libya were helping stockpile weapons in breach of an arms embargo. On 1 September, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, Borrel, met with head of the GNA, Serraj and head of the HoR, Saleh to help advance the dialogue process in the country. On 1 September, Italian Foreign Minister di Maio made an unannounced visit to Libya, where he met separately with Serraj and Saleh.
On 27 August, the US and UN co-chaired a meeting regarding the Berlin Process on Libya. On 30 August, the head of the Arab League, Aboul-Gheit, met with Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams. On 29 August Williams, arrived in Cairo for a three-day visit to engage with various officials on the Libya crisis. On 28 August, Turkey announced that it would undertake military exercises off the northwest coast of Cyprus.
On 31 July, a military court in Ajdabiya sentenced Ismail Bouzreeba al-Zway, a local photojournalist, to 15 years in prison on charges related to Islamist ‘terrorism.’
On 30 July, the deputy spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Zaytsev, stated that Russia and Turkey would be holding a third round of consultations in Moscow. On 27 July, Turkish Defence Minister Akar said that continued external military support represents the ‘greatest obstacle to peace’ in Libya. On 30 July, the US House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee agreed to amendments to the ‘Libya Stabilisation Act’ and unanimously approved the bill. On 27 July, US Chargé d’Affaires Harris travelled to Misrata and two days later travelled to Benghazi. On 4 August, the German Hamburg frigate went to support the EU’s Operation Irini to enforce the UN arms embargo.
On 24 July, AFRICOM said it had mounting evidence for heavy weapons delivery from Russia to the Wagner Group in Libya. On 28 July, Head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, announced the start of the international audit of the two branches of the CBL. Both the GNA and LNA forces continued to build up forces around Sirte last week
On 13 July, the HoR said that the Egyptian armed forces have the right to interfere in Libya should they see an imminent threat. On 13 July, Juwaili issued an official decree to create a new joint force to secure the western region. On 11 July, UNSMIL held a virtual meeting with the GNA MoI to discuss SSR and DDR efforts. On 12 July, Serraj met with the GNA military region commanders while LNA forces continued to mobilise to Sirte. On 8 and 9 July, clashes occurred between militias in Janzour that resulted in at least 10 people being killed.
On 14 June, the planned talks on Libya between Russian FM Lavrov and Russian Defence Minister Shogu and their Turkish counterparts were delayed. On 10 June, Egyptian President al-Sisi and US President Trump spoke about the Libya file over the phone. The same day, UNSMIL said that the GNA and LNA delegations were “fully engaged” in the third round of JMC 5+5. On 12 June, the Turkish Ministry of Defence announced that it conducted an 8-hour long coordinated Open Sea Training exercise off the Libyan coast.
On 6 June, Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, flanked by the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, and Speaker of the HoR, Aqeela Saleh, announced a new peace initiative for Libya. Following this announcement, there has been a flurry of international activity and reaction.
On 29 April, the LNA spokesperson, al-Mismari, announced that the LNA had agreed to a humanitarian truce for Ramadan. The GNA responded that it does not trust any ‘truce’ agreement made by the LNA. On 5 May, GNA-aligned forces began a ground assault on the LNA-controlled Watiya airbase south of Zuwara. On 30 April, a video was released showing the head of the HoR, Saleh, meeting with his fellow Obeidat tribal members to discuss his recent political initiative.
On 15 April, Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariyani called on fighters in a television interview to continue to fight against the LNA. The same day, UNSMIL released a statement expressing their concerns over the alleged release of 401 prisoners “without adequate legal proceedings or vetting” from Sabratha and Surman.
Over the last week, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Fathi Bashaagha, travelled to France and the UK for meetings. Angela Merkel interacted with the leader of the LNA, Haftar and head of the GNA, Serraj emphasising the need to implement a permanent ceasefire. From 12 March, the current Deputy Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, will serve as the acting Envoy to Libya. UNSMIL also called for an immediate humanitarian cessation of hostilities to allow local authorities to respond to the spread of COVID-19.
On 23 February, the second round of the UN-mediated 5 + 5 JMC discussions concluded in Geneva while the HoR and HCS both expressed reservations about the political track discussions due to start this week. On 22 February, the Zuwara municipality declared a state of emergency. The same day, heavy fighting broke out between anti-LNA forces and LNA forces 17km south of Ghariyan.
On 5 February, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boukadoum, met the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Rajma. On 6 February, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Bashaagha, met with a German government delegation. On 9 – 10 February, the UN-mediated “Economic and Financial Track” Dialogue took place in Cairo. On 10 February, US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, met with Bashaagha discussing the dismantlement of militias.
On 3 February, LNA head Haftar issued a decree assigning Major General al-Hamali as the commander of the Zawiyya Military Zone. On 6 February, LNA-affiliated airstrikes targeted a group of militants at their hideout on the outskirts of Derna. On 8 February, the UN-mediated 5 + 5 Joint Military Committee meeting in Geneva concluded.
From 1-2 February, clashes and aerial attacks between Haftar’s LNA and anti-LNA forces occurred in the al-Washka area. On 3 February, the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission mediated by UNSMIL began with meetings. On the same day, the Libyan Embassy in Niger released a video statement denouncing the GNA and declaring its recognition of the HoR as Libya’s legitimate and sovereign government.
On 19 January, Germany held an international conference on Libya in Berlin including multiple state leaders and high-level delegates. The conference concluded with unanimous agreement on a final 55-point communiqué. The communiqué called for the UNSC to create an international committee to monitor the ceasefire and to impose sanctions on violations of the ceasefire.
18 – 31 December 2019: UNHCR renewed its call for protecting civilians in Libya as international involvement increases
On 17 December, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Libya and met with Serraj and Haftar. On 21 December, a senior US State Department official said that the US is “very concerned” about the intensification of the conflict in Libya. On 23 December, the EU issued a statement reiterating its calls on all Libyan parties to cease all military actions and resume the political dialogue. On 24 December, a high-profile meeting gathered together representatives from the Russian and Turkish foreign ministries. On 25 December, Turkish President Erdogan paid a surprise visit to Tunisia and met with Tunisian President Saied. On 28 December, Italian Prime Minister Conte warned that Russia and Turkey, and not Europe, are setting the agenda in Libya’s conflict. On 29 December, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said that Greece wants to be included in the UN-sponsored Berlin conference on the Libya conflict. On 29 December UN Envoy to Libya, Salamé, called for greater civilian protection following several incidents in western Libya.
Over the last week, the LNA maintained its aerial dominance over Tripoli, while the GNA did not launch any aerial attacks. The LNA also launched air attacks on Tripoli’s western and southern periphery. On 27 November, a contingent of the loosely GNA aligned SPF and the local GNA-aligned PFG unit launched a coordinated attack on the al-Feel oilfield. On 28 November, the NOC confirmed that following the cessation of military activity at the al-Feel oil field, production had resumed.
On 14 October, suspected LNA aerial attacks struck a house in the al-Furnaj neighbourhood of Tripoli, killing three children and their mother, and injuring another child. On 13 October, a TRB commander accused the MoF and CBL of obstructing a deal for additional support from Turkey.
On 26 August, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with the new Commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen Townsend, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland. On 30 August, Norland met with the head of the High Council of State (HCS), Khalid al-Mishri. On 29 August, the UN published a report outlining the UNSG overview of the Libyan crisis as presented to the UN Security Council.
On 26 and 30 August, the LNA launched an assault on the mountain town Ghariyan but were repelled. On 28 August, anti-LNA forces launched an assault on LNA forces along the Zatarna axis in south-eastern Tripoli. On 31 August, four projectiles struck Mitiga airport in Tripoli, damaging the runway and hitting a passenger jet operated by Libyan Airlines.
The new US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, assumed his duties on 14 August. The UN investigated and condemned a LNA airstrike on Zuwara airport on 15 August.
On 10 August, a car bomb in the Hawari area of Benghazi targeting a UN convoy killed at least three UN staff members. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.
On 29 July, in a lengthy address to the UNSC, the UN Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame proposed a three-part immediate action to end the current conflict. On 28 July, Salame met with the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, at his headquarters in Rajma, in eastern Libya.
On 16 July, the Governments of Egypt, France, Italy, UAE, UK, and the US issued a statement calling for an immediate de-escalation and halt to the current fighting. On 11 July, the UN Deputy Envoy to Libya, met with the senior leadership of the eastern-based CBL. On 8 July, the Javelin anti-tank missiles discovered amidst LNA forces in Ghariyan were confirmed to belong to France.
On 7 July, the UN’s Deputy Envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, met with members of the eastern-based HoR as part of a 3-day tour of eastern Libya. On 5 July, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj visited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul. On 5 July, UNSC issued a statement condemning the attack on 2 July on a migrant detention centre in Tajoura. On 3 July, details emerged of the GNA Attorney General arresting two Russian men accused of attempting to influence future Libyan elections.
On 13 June, the NOC released a statement expressing its concern over “an increased military presence” at its Ras Lanuf oil terminal. On 14 June, the RASCO chairman issued a statement denying the NOC’s claims. On 16 June, the GNA Prime Minister, Fayez al-Serraj, announced a new peace plan initiative, under the auspices of the UN.
15 May – 21 May: UN Envoy to Libya warns civil war could “lead to the permanent division of the country”
On 21 May, the UN Envoy to Libya gave a stark address to the UN Security Council. He warned that Libya is on the verge of descending into a civil war “which could lead to the permanent division of the country”. He added that the damage already done will take years to mend, and that’s only if the war is ended now.